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“What’s past is prologue.”
—The Tempest
Welfare-to-work programs throughout history and across jurisdictions
exhibit similar traits, in form as well as in substance.  After several decades
that are now termed “the classical age of the welfare state,” numerous
Western countries have made significant changes to their welfare and
employment policy.  In many ways, these changes constitute a reversion to
the latter days of the poor laws, based on nineteenth century economic
theory that viewed the market as central in determining wages and
employment.  This shift may be perceived as changing the nature of the
welfare state or as completely abandoning the concept of the welfare state,
in favor of a different model: a contractual relationship between the state
and its members, manifested in conditioning access to welfare entitlements
on fulfillment of obligations.  Though antecedent elements of this format
have been exhibited throughout history, the dominance of this perspective,
especially in a period that follows the establishment of the welfare state, is
a remarkable phenomenon.
The purpose of this article is to attempt to deconstruct the reigning
umbrella ideology of contemporary welfare reform.  Welfare reform is often
framed in reference to the concept of the (social) contract, which includes
the conditioning rights on the fulfillment of obligations.  I argue that the
importation of contractual discourse to the welfare debate conceals certain
economic and ideological agenda that should be brought to light.  Even
† Senior Lecturer, Ono Academic College; Programme Director, Foundation for Law, Justice and
Society, a socio-legal research centre affiliated with Oxford University.
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though the notion of welfare reform is now common currency in most of the
industrial world, they tend to differ in their ideological emphasis, enforced
through law.  The relevant ideological emphasis, explored here, reveals the
true character of a given program, and thus should provide the true basis
for its normative analysis.  Strikingly, the poor laws, which were in force
throughout the English-speaking world for three and a half centuries, were
justified by very similar motivations as the contemporary welfare programs
in the United States.  The advantage of placing the past and the present side
by side arises from the fact that poor laws advanced policies that were
unencumbered by legal and moral reservations that putatively restrict
contemporary welfare reform.  Because of the similarities between the poor
laws and modern programs, the juxtaposition of past and present, therefore,
grants us a unique opportunity to detach ourselves from the reigning
ideologies of the twenty-first century, and to view current policies with the
wisdom accrued over several centuries.
In retrospect, the poor laws are now perceived as cruel and inhumane,
and their implementation tainted by arbitrariness and lack of respect for the
situation of the impoverished individual.  It is expected, therefore, that
modern society would distance itself not only from the poor law institutions,
such as the notorious workhouse, but also from the ideology and rationales
by which these laws were governed.  This article questions whether the
stated objective of breaking clear from poor law ideology was fulfilled.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
From the poor law era to present day, welfare-to-work† programs have
three features in common: first, they view work as a mechanism to deal
with economic problems, such as poverty, and social problems, such as
exclusion; second, they focus on the most impoverished members of
society; and third, they offer benefits as a conditional entitlement, mainly
for various work related obligations.  Despite significant variations, then, it
is important to keep in mind the main thrust of all the programs: the aim to
move individuals from the welfare rolls into the labor market.  Thus, on an
appropriate level of abstraction, some of the ideas informing current
programs are detectable in programs implemented centuries ago.  In their
excellent study of the development of legal regulation of the labor market,
Simon Deakin and Frank Wilkinson have recently noted that, although the
“context of those statutory provisions had completely changed . . . there
were many continuities in the transition from the poor law to social
security.”1 Instead of attempting to detail the wide range of texts and
analysis found in poor law material, this article is limited to addressing
those ideas that carry into or have analogies to contemporary welfare
programs.
Despite the continuity of many elements of welfare law, important
transformations have also occurred.  One of the greatest changes took place
at the beginning of the twentieth century.  It was then that the emphasis on
the duty to work at market wages, which was central to welfare to work
policies for over 300 years under the Anglo-American poor laws, shifted to
a guarantee of social insurance, full employment and access to, at least,
wages that support subsistence.  This trend escalated following the Second
World War, with an implementation of a model that “was the inversion of
the set of beliefs which sustained the new poor law”.2 The British National
Insurance Act of 19463 offered a modern, comprehensive form of social
insurance that extended to the employed, the self-employed, and the
unemployed, thus coming “close to realizing a model of employment-based
social citizenship.”4 This model challenged the poor law notion that the
poor were responsible for their own plight, and brought structural
† I prefer the somewhat cumbersome concept of welfare-to-work to refer to programs currently
addressed in European discourse under the heading of “activation” and in American discourse under the
heading of “workfare.”
1. SIMONDEAKIN& FRANKWILKINSON, THE LAW OF THE LABOURMARKET 110 (2005).
2. DEAKIN&WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 197.
3. 9 & 10 George VI c 67.
4. DEAKIN & WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 164; see also FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A.
CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR 410-412 (2d ed., Vintage Books 1993) (1971); WILLIAM P.
QUIGLEY, Backwards into the Future: How Welfare Changes in the Millenium Resemble English Poor
Law of the Middle Ages, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 101 (1998).
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explanations of poverty and unemployment to the fore.  Thus began the
period referred to as the “Age of the Welfare State,”5 characterized by
expansive legislation in the social and economic realms—here referred to
generally as “welfare”—and in the field of social security and
unemployment in particular.
More recently, the 1990s brought about a second wave of reform to
welfare-to-work policies as numerous Western countries made significant
changes to their programs.6 In many respects, these changes have much in
common with central poor law elements and with nineteenth century
economic theory that viewed the market as central in determining wages
and employment.7 Unemployment benefits were increasingly targeted for
cutbacks and the move away from universal benefits reinstated the practice
of making distinctions between deserving and undeserving poor.8 Instead
of a demand-side emphasis on full employment at decent wages, policies
were directed towards supply-side measures that would contribute both to
labor flexibility and to the integration of excluded groups into the labor
market.9
Notwithstanding the importance of the change in the mindset with
respect to welfare-to-work programs, this change does not explain the
attention that has been given to the analysis of welfare reform over the past
decade.  As I explain below, the issues addressed are not new, and the
measures applied are not ground-breaking.  Instead, I argue that the change
in the structure and character of welfare-to-work programs indicate a more
general shift in the relationship between the state and the impoverished
members of its society.  The shift may be perceived as a change within the
nature of the welfare state or as the complete abandonment of the concept,
in favor of a different model: a contractual relationship between the state
and its members that is manifested in conditioning access to welfare
entitlements on fulfillment of obligations.  Though antecedent themes of
this format have been exhibited throughout history, the dominance of this
perspective, especially in the period that followed the establishment of the
welfare state, is indeed a remarkable phenomenon.
The purpose of this article is to attempt to deconstruct the reigning
umbrella ideology of contemporary welfare reform, often referred to via
5. DEREK FRASER, THE EVOLUTION OF THE BRITISH WELFARE STATE 253 (2d ed.
2003).
6. These include Australia, Belgium, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Holland, Ireland, Israel
and the United States. See BARBARA SWIRSKI, FROM WELFARE TO WORK: GOVERNMENT
PLANS TO REDUCE INCOME SUPPORT BENEFITS (2000).
7. DEAKIN&WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 176.
8. DESMOND KING, ACTIVELY SEEKING WORK? 23 (1995) [hereinafter KING, ACTIVELY SEEKING
WORK?] 23; GUY STANDING, GLOBAL LABOUR FLEXIBILITY 227 (1999).
9. Id. at 185–92; LUC BOLTANSKI & EVE CHIAPELLO, THE NEW SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM
217–18 (Gregory Elliott trans., Verso 2005) .
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reference to the concept of the (social) contract,10 and the conditioning of
rights upon the fulfillment of obligations.  I shall argue that the contractual
rhetoric serves as a veil for distinct ideologies that should be brought to
light.  Since welfare reform is now common currency in most of the
industrial world, the emphasis placed on one ideology or another reveals the
true character of the program.  Strikingly, the poor laws, which were in
force throughout the English speaking world for three and a half centuries,
exhibited very similar motivations to contemporary welfare programs in the
United States.  The advantage of placing the past and the present side by
side arises from the fact that poor law practices advanced policies that were
unencumbered by legal and moral reservations that restrict contemporary
welfare reform, at least to some extent.
There is another important reason to show the connection between the
poor laws and contemporary American welfare regime. Gertrude
Himmelfarb states that “England served as a social laboratory for other
countries . . . Just as America was the exemplar of democracy, so England
was the exemplar of social welfare—and in both cases, for both good and
ill.”11 Himmelfarb explains that while “the old kind of charity left it to the
individual to alleviate, according to his means, the suffering he saw about
him,” the poor law transformed relief of material want into “a matter for
social action rather than public virtue.”12 And yet, notwithstanding their
historical standing, the poor laws are now perceived as cruel, inhumane and
their implementation tainted with arbitrariness and lack of respect to the
situation of the poor individual.13 It is expected, therefore, that modern
society would attempt to distance itself not only from the poor law
institutions, such as the notorious workhouse, but also from the ideology
and rationales that governed it. This article examines if the objective of
breaking clear from poor law ideology, assuming it indeed exists, is
fulfilled.
It is fitting to set the beginning of this exploration in England at the
start of the seventeenth century.  Before this period “it cannot be said that
Poor Laws, in our sense of the word [i.e. measures for the relief of
destitution] . . . existed at all; they might more fittingly be called laws
against the poor and the rights of labour.”14 Indeed, though the British Poor
10. Stuart White, Social Rights and the Social Contract—Political Theory and the New Welfare
Politics, 30 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 507 (2000); Peter Vincent-Jones, Contractual Governance: Institutional
and Organizational Analysis, 20 O.J.L.S. 317, 344 (2000); cf. Mark Freedland & Desmond King,
Contractual Governance and Illiberal Contracts: Some Problems of Contractualism as an Instrument of
Behaviour Management by Agencies of Government, 27 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 465 (2003) (criticizing
the use of contractual arrangements, especially in the realm of welfare-to-work, as a mechanism to
implement illiberal policy).
11. GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, THE IDEA OF POVERTY 5 (1984).
12. Id., at 148–49.
13. ROSS CRANSTON, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE WELFARE STATE 30 (1985).
14. T.W. FOWLE, THE POOR LAW 55 (1881). Thus, according to the British Statute of Labourers,
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Law Act of 160115 was, in effect, a consolidating measure, it has grown to
be viewed as “the history of the country’s social conscience.”16 American
programs, for their part, followed British ideology in both spirit and form
well into the twentieth century.  Desmond King, in his studies of programs
targeting impoverished people in Britain and the United States, concludes
that “the principal characteristics of the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601 . . .
were adopted by the American states both during and after the colonial
period.”17
There seems to be a consensus among students of social policy,
including those who agree on very little else, that the enactment of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 1996
(PRWORA)18 and the program it put into practice—Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families (TANF), represented the most important moment for
the American welfare system since 1935.19 PRWORA introduced TANF,
replacing Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), the American
welfare policy in place since 1935.  PRWORA also amended one of the
most important social assistance programs in America—the Food Stamps
Program (FSP).20 The purpose of the FSP is to provide low-income
households with a more nutritious diet by giving families the ability to
purchase food supplies at retail stores, as an alternative to receiving meals
at soup kitchens or religious institutions.21 Food stamps are a critical source
of financial assistance to those in need, increasing household income by
over forty percent.22 Even prior to the 1996 reform, food stamps were
inextricably linked to income support, with eighty-seven percent of AFDC
recipients receiving food stamps.23 PRWORA made this link formal by
1351, 25 Edward III c. 3:
And because many sound beggars do refuse to labour so long as they can live from begging
alms, giving themselves up to idleness and sins, and, at times, to robbery and other crimes - let
no one, under the aforesaid pain of imprisonment presume, under colour of piety or alms to
give anything to such as can very well labour, or to cherish them in their sloth, so that thus
they may be compelled to labour for the necessaries of life.
15. Poor Law Act of 1601, 43 Eliz. I c. 4 (Eng.).
16. H.L. BEALES, The New Poor Law, 15 HISTORY 308, 309 (1931).
17. KING, Actively Seeking Work?, supra note 8, 224 n.2; see also DESMOND KING, IN THE NAME
OF LIBERALISM: ILLIBERAL SOCIAL POLICY IN THE USA AND BRITAIN 258–65 (1999) [hereinafter KING,
IN THE NAME OF LIBERALISM].
18. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), Pub.
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
19. See, e.g., KING, IN THE NAME OF LIBERALISM, supra note 17, at 277; see also RONALD
DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 320 (2000) (stating that “[t]he 1996 Welfare Reform Act was a plain
defeat for social justice.”).
20. Food Stamp Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-113, 91 Stat. 974, as amended (1977).
21. See Preamble to the Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-525, 78 Stat. 703-709
22. ED BOLEN, A Poor Measure of the Wrong Thing: The Food Stamp Program’s Quality Control
System Discourages Participation by Working Families, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 213, 216 (2001).
23. STEPHEN B. PAGE & MARY B. LARNER, Introduction to the AFDC Program, 7 THE FUTURE
OF CHILDREN 20, 22 (1997), http://www.futureofchildren.org/usr_doc/vol7no1ART2.pdf (last visited
Nov. 16, 2008).
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stating that participation in TANF serves as “passport eligibility”: a
precondition for entitlement to food stamps.24 Because of this the majority
of single-parent households receiving food stamps also participate in
TANF.25 The legal links between the two programs, which were
strengthened following PRWORA, along with the fact that both serve very
similar purposes, suggest that an analysis of TANF is incomplete without
addressing the reform of the FSP.
Before embarking on analysis of these programs, an introductory note
is warranted.  America’s 1996 PRWORA reform defederalized welfare
programs, thereby complicating research and analysis of these programs.
Though the federal PRWORA is lengthy and elaborate legislation, states are
charged with designing and implementing important features of the
programs, which are detailed in state, and not in federal, statutes.  Indeed,
one may argue that no “American” welfare program, per se, actually exists
and that research must focus on the individual programs of fifty states, or
even 3,000 counties, since each exhibit local variations.26 Moreover,
especially in the American case, the issue of local control over relief giving
is not incidental, but rather a central policy decision.  It should be clarified
that local control was prevalent decades before TANF came into force.  In
her classic critique, Winifred Bell criticized AFDC for the weight given to
“subjective standards by the community, the agency and the individual
worker”.27 Moreover, beginning in 1981, the Reagan administration
granted states waivers from certain federal regulations.  The waiver requests
were examined with leniency, usually approved with impressive
expeditiousness and soon expanded to cover the field of welfare.28
PRWORA further expanded the devolution of control over welfare
programs, leaving to the states “to adopt any level of benefits they wished,
to set any waiting periods, and to fix the maximum period of benefit.”29
And yet, significant elements of TANF and FSP are mandated by
federal legislation.  It has been noted that PRWORA “did not simply
devolve functions to states; rather, it established specific funding and policy
rules, requirements, and signals both to encourage and to discourage
24. Pub. L. 88-525, 78 Stat. 703 (codified as amended at 7 USCA § 2014).
25. LAURA A. CASTNER & RANDY ROSSO, CHARACTERISTICS OF FOOD STAMP HOUSEHOLDS-
FISCAL YEAR 1998, xv–xvi (2000), http://www.fns.usda.gov/oane/MENU/Published/snap/FILES/
Participation/char98.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2008).
26. JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP AND WORKFARE IN THE UNITED STATES
AND WESTERN EUROPE 81 (2004).
27. WINIFRED BELL, AID TODEPENDENT CHILDREN 41 (1965).
28. SUSAN BENNETT & KATHLEEN A. SULLIVAN, Disentitling the Poor: Waivers and Welfare
“Reform”, 26 U. OF MICHIGAN J. OF L. REFORM 741 (1993); LUCY WILLIAMS, The Abuse of Section
1115 Waivers: Welfare Reform in Search of a Standard, 12 YALE L. AND POL’Y REV. 8, 24-27 (1994).
29. PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 4, at 114; see also id. at 94; MINOR MYERS, A Redistributive
Role for Local Government, 36 URBAN LAWYER 753 (2004).
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particular state action.”30 The most significant and fundamental policy
decisions are dictated at the federal level, while state discretion is largely
limited to implementation.31 This result has been intensified by the
reauthorization of TANF as part of the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) of
2005, which extends funding and authority for the program through 2010.32
For example, federal rules have substantially increased the proportion of
assistance recipients who are required to participate in work activities for a
specified number of hours a week.  The twelve categories of work that may
count towards work participation are now clearly and narrowly defined in
the Code of Federal Regulations.33 States are now subject to a five percent
reduction in their block grant if they fail to implement procedures and
controls consistent with the Department of Health and Human Service
(HHS) Secretary’s regulations.34 In addition, states are forbidden from
counting basic education or education towards a Bachelor’s Degree as
vocational skill training.35 Moreover, the substantive provisions of local
programs show a striking degree of similarity to each other (e.g. residence
laws that deny payments to recipients who have not lived in a certain
locality over a certain period) even when the particulars (e.g. the extent of
the period; different payment levels) may differ substantially.36 Finally,
since state practices are subject to judicial scrutiny by the Supreme Court,
the Court’s affirmation of certain state practices, discussed below, reveals
some of the relevant norms governing the TANF and Food Stamps
programs as a whole.  In sum, while the analysis and comparison of
particular state programs is undoubtedly relevant and important, the merit
of the broad, federal overview is not undermined by their unique
dissimilarities.
It is also important to remember that local discretion is not a neutral
factor.  Indeed, insofar as poor relief is concerned, this feature has clear
historical antecedents.37 One may ask whether the issue of local control is
at all relevant to the normative assessment of a given system.  Under certain
circumstances, it may indeed be irrelevant. Take for example, a school
board’s control over the number of days per year that its teachers are
deemed “employed.” In and of itself, this discretion would not, barring
extraordinary circumstances, affect our conclusion that children in different
school districts have, or do not have, a right to be educated.  But if the
30. MARK GREENBERG, Welfare Reform and Devolution: Looking Back and Forward, 19
BROOKINGS REVIEW 20, 21 (2001).
31. CANDICE HOKE, State Discretion Under New Federal Welfare Legislation, 9 STANFORD L.
AND POL’Y REV. 115 (1998).
32. Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 20 U.S.C.).
33. 45C.F.R. § 261.2 (2006).
34. DRA Sec. 7102(c).
35. 45 C.F.R § 261.31 (2006)
36. HOKE, supra note 31.
37. DEAKIN&WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 128–29.
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school board exerts control that denies acceptance of children with
disabilities, for example, this local decision would threaten the vitality of a
child’s equal right to education in the particular jurisdiction.  A federal
standard limiting local control and forbidding the local school board from
discriminating against children with disabilities would promote children’s
right to education and to equal treatment.  We find, therefore, that the
administrative issue of local control should be assessed through the lens of
another factor—that of discretion.
The relationship between discretion, welfare policy and individual
rights is an interesting one that has been addressed by legal scholars.38 The
conventional position argues for an inverse relationship between individual
rights and administrative discretion—the weaker the protection of the right,
the more the individual is at the mercy of the administrator.39 As Robert
Goodin notes, “[t]he distinctive feature of rights is that they constitute
control from below. . . . Rights thus constitute one clear way of diminishing
the discretionary power of state officials, by giving those subject to their
authority a certain measure of legal control over them.”40
This erosion of rights through the strengthening of local control was
already apparent, in the context of welfare policy, in poor law legislation
and practice.  Himmelfarb notes that the use of open-ended legislation, that
was to be filled by local implementation, was rampant in the administration
of poor laws.  She demonstrates that the concepts of discretion and rights
are closely related:
The frustration was all the worse because the ‘right’ was couched in
language that was so vague, all those denominated ‘poor’ being told that
they had a ‘right to a “reasonable subsistence,” or “a fair subsistence” or “an
adequate subsistence.”‘ . . . The alternative to this vacuous notion of right was
the idea of ‘contract.’41
While Himmelfarb concludes that this vagueness offered claimants an
38. JOEL F. HANDLER, Discretion in Social Welfare: The Uneasy Position in the Rule of Law, 92
YALE L.J. 1270 (1983); WILLIAM H. SIMON, Legality, Bureaucracy and Class in the Welfare System, 92
YALE L.J. 1198 (1983).
39. MICHAEL ADLER & STEWART ASQUITH, Discretion and Power, in DISCRETION AND
WELFARE 9, 12 (Michael Adler & Stewart Asquith eds., 1981). However, some have observed that
welfare interests require a certain degree of administrative discretion (see, e.g., Neville S. Harris, The
Welfare State, Social Security, and Social Citizenship Rights, in SOCIAL SECURITY LAW IN
CONTEXT 3, 36 (Neville S. Harris ed., 2000)); CHARLES A. REICH, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J.
733 (1963); WILLIAM H. SIMON, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 STAN. L. REV.
1431, 1489 (1986) (evaluating the substantive rights theme dominant in liberal welfare discourse);
ROBERT E. GOODIN, REASONS FOR WELFARE: THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE WELFARE STATE 190
(1988).
40. GOODIN, supra note 39, at 211.
41. HIMMELFARB, supra note 11, at 161–62 [final emphasis added] (quoting Report from his
Majesty’s Commissioners for Inquiring into the Administration and Practical Operation of the Poor
Laws (London, 1834)); see also SIMON DEAKIN, The Capability Concept and the Evolution of European
Social Policy, in SOCIAL WELFARE AND E.U. LAW 3 (Michael Dougan and Eleanor Spaventa eds.,
2005) (discussing the “fatal ambiguity” of poor law principles, such as “less eligibility”, id., at 13).
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opportunity to fill the open-ended terms with their own “desires and
imaginations,” Ross Cranston argues that this framework made possible the
implementation of the poor law in a manner that was arbitrary,
discriminatory, arrogant, “and in some cases downright cruel.”42 Indeed,
when the power to distinguish between deserving and undeserving poor was
transferred to private and charity organizations in 1870s, such as the
Christian Organization Society (COS), the bureaucracy of relief became
entangled with social control and families were seen as undeserving “by
reference to the qualities of temperance, cleanliness and thrift”.43
The analogy to twenty-first century faith-based initiatives is relevant.
And, indeed, contemporary critics of welfare-to-work programs similarly
suggest that in order “for there to be rights in fact . . . eligibility has to be
fairly clear-cut, with a minimum of field-level discretion.”44
Complementing the discretion granted to officials, the issue of local
control or, in poor law jargon, the concept of “settlement,” is central to the
understanding of the system.  Under the British Act of Settlement, local
justices had the power to remove “any Person or Persons that are likely to
be chargeable to the parish [that they] shall come to inhabit.”45 It has been
argued that “poor law was largely settlement law, and settlement law
provided the rights and obligations which underpinned both the right to
poor relief and the duty to provide it.”46 Though the opening statement of
the passage quoted may claim too much, it nonetheless indicates the
centrality of the organizational feature of distributing relief solely through
the mechanism of the local parish.  The “whole business of settlements”
was perceived, even by those who were unsympathetic to any form of relief,
as “contradictory to all ideas of freedom” and “as a most disgraceful and
disgusting tyranny.”47 The situation of paupers was made all the more
difficult by the fact that the local administration of the laws accentuated the
harsh provisions of the Act of Settlement with even harsher practices,
ignoring even the few safeguards that the law supplied.48 This was partially
because each parish operated separately with considerable legal discretion,
exercising a degree of freedom that “led to increasingly idiosyncratic
methods of distributing poor relief.”49
In addition to the evident effect on the situation of claimants, such an
extreme degree of local control and discretion has also been considered to
42. CRANSTON, supra note 13, at 30.
43. DEAKIN&WILKINSON, supra note 1 at 148.
44. HANDLER, supra note 26, at 248.
45. Poor Relief Act of 1662 (known as the “Settlement Act”) §1.
46. LORIE R. CHARLESWORTH, The Poor Law, 6 J. OF SOC. SEC. L. 79, 80 (1999).
47. THOMAS R. MALTHUS, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION 344 (1798).
48. CRANSTON, supra note 13, at 24 (discussing safeguards such as the requirement to obtain
judicial order before removal).
49. CHARLESWORTH, supra note 46, at 85.
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be an ill-founded mechanism in dealing with the causes and symptoms of
unemployment:
It can only be concluded that ‘the elementary lesson that effective treatment
of the Unemployment problem is utterly beyond the power of Local
Government has not been learned.’ Even with regard to the provision of
maintenance, the government refused to realise ‘the difficulties inherent in
the use of a local system of relief to cure a depression national in its scope,
and due to causes that are national and even international rather than local
in their character.’50
Nonetheless, we find contemporary programs, especially in the United
States, following similar paths.  Though some aspects of welfare programs
are directed by the central (in some cases—federal) government, the
emphasis on local control continually resurfaces in present-day programs.51
Indeed, it has been argued that, like settlement policy, contemporary
residency state laws “cement[] the relationship between a regional welfare
system and a regional economy” and thus contribute to maintaining a low
wage labor pool in the locality.52 Moreover, states and municipalities have
a strong fiscal incentive to reduce welfare expenses (and taxes) so as not to
deter business and wealthy individuals from residing there.  Alongside the
noticeable hesitation of local public officials to assist disenfranchised,
unpopular constituencies, granting state and local governments more
authority to implement welfare programs will and already has led to harsh
conditions and lower rates of benefit.53 Indeed, this rationale was an
important part of the reason for the initial nationalization of the American
benefit program in 1935.54
II.
CONDITIONING BENEFITS: PAST AND PRESENT
We can now begin to investigate the nature of conditions placed on
receipt of welfare benefits.  Conditioning benefits upon the beneficiary’s
behavior and inclinations is a central feature in the typology of welfare-to-
work programs in the U.S. and elsewhere.55 It can even be argued that the
precise nature of the condition gives each welfare relief program its specific
50. SIDNEY WEBB & BEATRICE WEBB, ENGLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT: ENGLISH POOR LAW
HISTORY—PART II: THE LAST HUNDRED YEARS 708 (1963) [hereinafter WEBB & WEBB II],
quoting FELIX MORLEY, UNEMPLOYMENT RELIEF IN GREAT BRITAIN 3 (1924), and W.T. LAYTON ET
AL., THE THIRDWINTER OFUNEMPLOYMENT 48 (1923); see also DEAKIN&WILKINSON, supra note 1 at
193–99.
51. Dan Finn, Welfare to Work 13 Benefits 93, 95 (2004); Quigley, supra note 4, at 106–7.
52. PIVEN& CLOWARD, supra note 4, at 144; see generally id. at 123-46.
53. HOKE, supra note 31.
54. WILLIAMS, supra note 28, at 32–36.
55. CHRIS GROVER & JOHN STEWART, THE WORK CONNECTION 23 (2002); DAVID
MACAROV, WORK AND WELFARE—THE UNHOLY ALLIANCE 11 (1980).
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character.  Thus, for each program, the following questions should be
addressed: Whose benefits are conditioned? What is demanded?  And Why
are these conditions put forth (that is—what is the rationale underlying the
conditioning of welfare relief)?
Only the first question may be answered simply insofar as this article is
concerned: among those subject to various kinds of conditioning, the poor,
able-bodied unemployed stand out mainly because they are perceived as
able to change their predicament and to cease living on state aid.  The
subsequent questions posed above broaden the horizon of issues that may
be dealt with because the conditions placed on the unemployed occupy a
considerable range, they may be as amorphous as “being responsible for
their family’s well being” or as concrete as “accepting any job offered to
them.” The rationales and motivations underlying these requirements are
similarly spread across a broad continuum that will be explored below.
The conditioning of relief upon various work requirements is hardly
surprising to a twenty-first century student of social welfare policy and
legislation.  Indeed, it is actually the prospect of unconditional benefits that
seems a peculiar suggestion.56 Since the poor laws of the seventeenth
century, welfare and work have not been viewed as separate.
Prominent amongst the conditions of the poor law programs was the
idea that able-bodied poor persons would receive only “Indoor Relief”
within the confines of the workhouse.  One justification for such measures
is the assertion that “if individuals or their dependants are to be selected for
maintenance . . . they should in their maintenance be duly controlled by the
Authority which supports them”.57 Subsequent political and institutional
contingencies required a revision of this condition, resulting in the
introduction of alternative measures.  One such alternative was the Labor
Yard where the poor were required to perform outdoor tasks. “Relief
Work” projects that benefited society were orchestrated in several regions
often motivated by the desire to keep the claimants occupied.58
Occasionally, programs sought to place claimants in jobs in the community,
by requiring claimants either to accept any offer of employment or to
“actively” or “genuinely” seek work on their own.59
It is possible to suggest several, different rationales as dominant in the
analysis of welfare-to-work conditions.  Moreover, more than one agenda
motivates or advances certain programs and certain provisions within
programs.  The text of the legal provisions does not offer a straightforward
position on the matter, leaving room for support of different approaches.
Thus, Piven and Cloward go to great lengths to show that even when certain
56. MACAROV, supra note 55, at 11.
57. JC M’Vail Report on the Methods and Results of the Present System of Administering Indoor
and Outdoor Medical Relief (1907) 148 in WEBB&WEBB II, supra note 50, at 513.
58. WEBB&WEBB II, supra note 50, at 642–43.
59. For a detailed description of this policy see KING, Actively Seeking Work?, supra note 8.
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policies “may be justified in the language of moral virtue . . . their
economic effect is to ensure a pool of marginal workers.”60 And, when
Louisiana stopped providing benefits to thirty percent of welfare cases
(ninety-five percent of which were African Americans) because the children
were born out of wedlock, state officials “agreed that their law was as
frankly directed towards saving public funds as it was toward improving
family morals.”61 This conflation of motivations is quite natural, of course,
as “not every social practice can be interpreted in the sense of discovering
its underlying social vision.”62 Finding an unequivocal interpretation of the
social vision of the programs is not the task at hand.  Instead, it is important
to map out the rationales motivating welfare-to-work programs in general.
Such a platform will also assist in comparing, contrasting and evaluating
different programs and their different emphases.  This article highlights four
rationales that are especially relevant in the workings of poor law and
contemporary welfare-to-work programs: first, the “Deterrence Rationale”
under which applicants are discouraged from claiming relief because relief
payments are conditioned on harsh requirements; second, the “Fiscal
Rationale” which stipulates that resources should be used efficiently and
public costs should be kept to a minimum; third, the “Moral Argument”
which views work as having an inherent moral value and utilizes various
mechanisms of social control; fourth, the “Contractual Argument” which
manifests a quid-pro-quo approach to welfare relief, and requires clients to
give up “something” in return for the benefits received.
It may be necessary to provide a brief defense of this list.  As noted
below, many authors describing poor law programs focus on their deterrent
nature, while appraisers of contemporary programs tend to identify a shift
to a contractual discourse.  The two perspectives, however, are not as far
apart as implied by this positioning.  If contractual discourse is understood
to encompass all forms of conditioning, then it indeed contains all the
ideologies and rationales listed above, including the deterrent aspect.  If, on
the other hand, the contractual rationale is an independent ideology that
focuses on the reciprocal, quid-pro-quo attribute of human relations, then it
stands distinct not only from a deterrent approach, but also from those
approaches that highlight, inter alia, fiscal or moralistic explanations.
It is hardly contested that the rationales listed above are not
independent of each other.  Different ideologies may be invoked to bring
about similar consequences while certain programs may reflect more than
one rationale.  And yet, there are significant differences between the
motivations, as each reflects a different perspective on human interaction,
free will, the image of beneficiaries, and various social and legal
60. PIVEN& CLOWARD, supra note 4, at 127.
61. JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, BLAME WELFARE, IGNORE POVERTY
AND INEQUALITY 165 (2007).
62. HUGHCOLLINS, JUSTICE IN DISMISSAL 74 (1992).
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institutions.  Therefore, though the categorizing of a specific feature of the
programs under one rationale and not another is not incontestable, this
thematic portrayal helpfully maps the dominant rationales and the
provisions that they inspire.
III.
CONDITIONING FORDETERRENCE
For many commentators, conditions for relief under the poor laws, and
especially those applied under the New Poor Law of 1834,63 were driven by
the desire to deter claimants from applying for benefits.64 If, indeed, that is
the case, why not indeed accept Charles Murray’s suggestion to opt for the
“Alexandrian solution” and “cut the knot, for there is no way to untie it”?65
Indeed, for some “abolitionists” during the poor law era, reducing the
number of applicants was deemed an end in itself, and the existence of a
system of relief was viewed as a concession.66 Furthermore, these views
clearly crossed the Atlantic as well as the threshold of the twentieth century.
Josephine Brown writes about welfare provision in the United States during
the Great Depression:
The conviction still prevailed generally that relief should be made so
disagreeable to the recipient that he would be persuaded or forced to devise
some means of self support in order to get off the list as swiftly as
possible.67
But for the majority, deterrence was seen as the negative corollary of
the provision of relief: relief should be given only to those who are in
material dire straits and those individuals who have other options, whatever
they may be, should prefer those options.  Indeed, charity was to be
provided under conditions so detestable that “persons not in danger of
starvation will not consent to receive it.”68 This notion finds a modern
analog in the persistent concern about fraud in modern welfare programs;
those who do have other feasible options but choose to receive benefits are
viewed as fraudulent claimants.69 Thus, to deter these claimants, harsh
63. 4 & 5 George IV c 76.
64. See, e.g., KING, IN THE NAME OF LIBERALISM, supra note 8, at 240; SIDNEY WEBB &
BEATRICE WEBB, ENGLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT: ENGLISH POOR LAW HISTORY—PART I: THE OLD
POOR LAW 243 (1963) [hereinafter WEBB & WEBB I]; WEBB & WEBB II, supra note 50, at 132–33;
PIVEN& CLOWARD, supra note 4, at 33–36.
65. CHARLESMURRAY, LOSINGGROUND 228 (1986).
66. Most prominently DAVID RICARDO, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION Ch.
5 (1817, reprint 1996); See BRIAN INGLIS, POVERTY AND THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 185 (1972).
67. JOSEPHINE BROWN, PUBLIC RELIEF 1929–1939 17 (1940).
68. Cited in AMYD. STANLEY, Beggars Can’t Be Choosers, in LABOR LAW IN AMERICA 128,
137 (Christopher L. Tomlins & Andrew J. King eds., 1992).
69. I.T. SMITH, INDUSTRIAL LAW 543 (7th ed, 2000); DEAKIN & WILKINSON, supra note 1, at
178–79.
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conditions are attached to benefits.
We find, then, that historically deterrence is connected to conditional
benefits via the mechanism of needs-testing.  Thus, one of the recurring
themes in texts of the poor law era is the view that relief of the destitute
serves, and should serve, as a test for destitution: under the more moderate
approach to deterrence, (i.e. distinct from the position that wishes to empty
the welfare roles entirely), only the seriously destitute would accept the
terms of the “deal,” thus creating a mechanism that would separate the
deserving (the “truly destitute”) from the undeserving (the fraudulent
claimants).  This understanding of the deterrence mechanism may help to
explain the seemingly incoherent combination of a contractual or
conditional method with the emphasis on deterrence.  A short explanation
of this argument may be warranted.
In terms of public perception, it was routinely argued that the existence
of the working poor undermined the justification for granting aid that could
place the non-working, able-bodied pauper in an overly advantageous
material position.70 In terms of the structure and rationale behind welfare-
to-work programs, however, this distinction between the laboring poor and
able-bodied paupers is of negligible importance, especially when contrasted
with the distinction between the able-bodied unemployed and the
“impotent” (aged and infirm) unemployed.71 The reason for this seems
plain, for it is this latter distinction that discriminates clearly (at least
theoretically)72 between those who cannot gain subsistence due to their own
fault or choice, and those who had fallen victim to ill fate.  Incentives and
disincentives could (again, in theory) target those whose personal capacities
enabled them to work, thus eliminating the category of “undeserving poor”
who are able to work but “refuse” to do so.  It should come as no surprise,
therefore, that this distinction was a central tenet in the American Quincy
Report of 1821:
[T]he poor are of two classes: first, the impotent poor, in which
denomination are included all who are wholly incapable of work, through
old age, infancy, sickness or corporeal debility; second, the able poor, in
which denomination are included all who are capable of work of some
nature or other . . . .73
70. HIMMELFARB, supra note 11, at 163-64.
71. MACAROV, supra note 55, at 35–37.
72. Liverpool philanthropist William Rathbone saw this effort as futile and its consequences as
potentially disastrous:
It is beyond the omnipotence of Parliament to meet the conflicting claims of justice to the community;
severity to the idle and vicious and mercy to those stricken down into penury by the visitation of
God . . . .
Quoted in DEREK FRASER, Introduction, in THE NEW POOR LAW IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY 1, 13 (Derek Fraser ed., 1976).
73. Massachusetts, General Court, Committee on Pauper Laws, Chaired by Josiah Quincy,
Report of Committee to Whom Was Referred the Consideration of the Pauper Laws of the
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According to the report, assisting the poor would diminish their work
ethic by “destroying the economical habits and eradicating the providence
of the laboring class of society . . . .”74 Indeed, we find that the necessity to
distinguish between the deserving and undeserving poor motivates a
practical element of poor law schemes, that of ‘less eligibility,” referred to
below.  This idea has influenced contemporary perceptions of the welfare-
to-work mechanism.  Indeed, it has influenced Supreme Court
jurisprudence: in rejecting a challenge to the work requirement, Justice
Powell stated, in a manner that corresponds with distinctions between
deserving and undeserving poor, that welfare is intended for those who are
“genuinely incapacitated and most in need,”75 thus reaffirming the rationale
behind the work requirement, not far removed from the workhouse test—
the offer of work is to serve as the test for relief.
The linking of deterrence to the distinction between deserving and
undeserving poor results in the irony that the more successful deterrent
measures are, the fewer “undeserving” claimants remain on the welfare
roles.  Sidney and Beatrice Webb, looking backwards towards the poor law,
and Robert Goodin, predicting the effects of contemporary welfare
programs, reached the same conclusion: a successful mechanism would
thus lead to a situation where those truly deserving of unconditional relief
would be subject to the harshest measures.76
The rationale of deterrence is most directly exhibited in the English
institution of the workhouse, as unequivocally expressed in the 1834 Poor
Law Report:
Into such a house none will enter voluntarily; work, confinement and
discipline will deter the indolent and vicious; and nothing but extreme
necessity will induce any to accept the comfort which must be obtained by
the surrender of their free agency and the sacrifice of their accustomed
habits and gratifications.77
The workhouse was intended to eradicate all forms of outdoor relief,
that is relief granted to the poor while they could reside at home.78
Permission to erect the first workhouses was granted in the early eighteenth
century, but workhouses became a ubiquitous phenomenon after becoming
Commonwealth, 1821, in PUBLIC WELFARE ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: SELECTED
DOCUMENTS 32 (Sophonisba P. Breckinridge, ed. 1927).
74. Id. at 33.
75. New York State Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973).
76. WEBB&WEBB II, supra note 50, 157; ROBERTGOODIN, Social Welfare as a Collective Social
Responsibility, in David Schmidtz & Robert Goodin (eds.) Social Welfare and Individual
Responsibility—For and Against, 97, 173–74 (CUP 1998).
77. Report from his Majesty’s Commissioners for Inquiring into the Administration and Practical
Operation of the Poor Laws, at 271 (London, 1834) [hereinafter Poor Law Report].
78. FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, The Relief of Welfare in HOW WE LOST THE
WAR ON POVERTY (Marc Pilisuk & Phyllis Pilisuk eds.) 269, 287 (2002)
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a compulsory mechanism under the New Poor Law.79 Under the New Poor
Law, poor families were forced to enter the workhouse, sometimes as a
whole unit, but on occasion men, women, and children were put in separate
institutions.80 Cranston contends that even the name “workhouse” is
misleading, since the workhouse served not as a source of employment but
as a test of destitution itself, a medium for relief and a form of social
control.81 Derek Fraser views the workhouse as the mechanism that set the
principle of less eligibility into practice.82 This principle is succinctly
explained by the Royal Commission:
The first and most essential of all conditions . . . is, that [the able bodied
person’s] situation on the whole shall not be made really or apparently so
eligible as the situation of the independent labourer of the lowest class . . .
Every penny bestowed, that tends to render the condition of the pauper
more eligible than that of the independent labourer, is a bounty on indolence
and vice.83
It should be noted that the concept of less eligibility applied not only to
decisions regarding rates of relief, but was also used to justify deplorable
conditions in the workhouse.  For example, a prominent economist at time,
J.R. McCulloch, argued that “The able-bodied tenant of a workhouse should
be made to feel that his situation is decidedly less comfortable than that of
the industrious labourer who supports himself.”84
And so, Fraser concludes, the workhouse “was not intended to reduce
poverty but to deter pauperism.”85 Or, as described by one official of the
period: “The advantage of the workhouse to the parish does not arise from
what the poor people can do towards their own subsistence, but from the
apprehensions the poor have of it.”86
In a similar vein, Sidney and Beatrice Webb argue that the utility of the
workhouse test lay in the fact that “except in the very direst necessity” a
person would prefer not to willingly admit himself.87 Indeed, the deterrent
nature of poor law programs is central to the Webbs’ analysis.  So much so,
in fact, that they find that just as the prospect of successful deterrence was
the driving force behind institutions such as the workhouse, the main reason
for the demise of such institutions lies in their inability to furnish sufficient
deterrence.88 As political and institutional developments forced changes on
79. HIMMELFARB, supra note 11, at 26.
80. The variations depended on time and place, as various workhouses had different policies at
different times (seeWEBB&WEBB II, supra note 50, at 132–33).
81. CRANSTON, supra note 13, at 42.
82. FRASER, supra note 5, at 45.
83. Poor Law Report, supra note 77, at 228 (emphasis added).
84. Cited in FRASER, supra note 5, at 46.
85. Id. at 50.
86. WEBB&WEBB I, supra note 50, at 244.
87. Id. at 243.
88. For a similar analysis with respect to the labor yards see RUTH HUTCHINSON CROKER, The
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the intolerable nature of the workhouse, the workhouse no longer deterred a
significant portion of the populous from entering.  A London Inspector in
the early nineteenth century observed that “the Workhouse is attractive to
paupers . . . there are many persons to whom the Workhouse furnishes no
test of destitution.”89 Indeed, it became clear that a complete ban on
outdoor relief was impractical to implement, and so in some cases outdoor
relief was permitted subject to a strict work test—the requirement to be
available for work, accept work offered and actively seek work.90 Over the
years the work test was implemented in an increasing number of regions
and by the early twentieth century regions representing three quarters of the
English population had some form of labor test in place.91
It may be suggested that the British institution that was established to
supplement the workhouse suffered a similar fate for similar reasons—lack
of deterrence.  The Labor Yards were intended to fill in the gap left by the
slow decline of the Workhouses and to reduce the costs of full-time
maintenance of the poor.92 This work, assigned "purely for “[deterrence],”93
was limited to such tasks as stone breaking, wood cutting, or oakum
picking.  And, once again, the Royal Commission of 1905–1909 saw no
reason to maintain the system that had obviously failed its purpose, since
“there grows up a nucleus of loafers, who have found the stoneyard under
lax supervision an easy way of earning a scanty living . . . .”94 Then, as
now, a perspective that idealized the value of work for work’s sake was
prevalent.  It is illuminating to note that those who participated in physical
tasks for even the most negligible compensation were admonished for
“earning a scanty living.” If this criticism was leveled at welfare recipients
because they were willing to accept the conditions that were intended to
deter them, then the more cynical goal of contractual deterrence, lowering
the number of applicants, appears to have been at work.
To combat fraud in early welfare-to-work programs, England
introduced harsh conditions for benefits.  The classification of all paupers
as fraudsters was instrumental to this process.  The low rates of relief at the
time of the poor law ironically served as a basis for such a broad
generalization since, as the Local Government Board of 1881 deduced, the
rates of benefits were so minimal that the poor must be working while
receiving relief: “the old abuse of relief in aid of wages must largely prevail
Victorian Poor Law in Crisis and Change 19 ALBION 19, 36 (1987).
89. Id. at 376–77.
90. DEAKIN&WILKINSON, supra note 1 at 137–38.
91. Id.
92. CROKER, supra note 88 at 36.
93. M.A. CROWTHER, THE WORKHOUSE SYSTEM 1834-1929: THE HISTORY OF AN ENGLISH
SOCIAL INSTITUTION 198 (1981).
94. WEBB&WEBB II, supra note 50, at 203–4; Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws
and Relief of Distress, Poor Law Commissioners, at 204 (London: HMSO, 1909).
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in some form or other.”95 The leading economist at the time of the
enactment of the New Poor Law justified the severity of the proposals of
the Royal Commission as necessary due to the failure of the Old Poor Law
to eradicate cases of abuse and fraud.  In his conclusion, he suggests that
deterrent measures are a compromise between those who support the need
for such a system and those who would like to see it abolished:
The Commissioners, with very few exceptions, appear to have set out with a
determination to find nothing but abuses in the Old Poor Law, and to make
the most of them; and this was no more than might have been expected,
seeing that this was the most likely way to effect its abolition.96
We find, then, that the workhouse and the labor yards, the separation of
families, and dire conditions for relief all had, to a certain extent, one
common objective—to make the provision of benefits as repellent as
possible in order to deter applicants from applying.  In this manner, the poor
law motto—“work for those that will [l]abour; [p]unishment for those who
will not; and [b]read for those who cannot”97—was put into practice.  The
goals of those who argued for deterring individuals from applying for
assistance were not monolithic: some viewed the dire conditions as a self-
maintaining test of desert—only “deserving” individuals and “those who
cannot” work would accept the conditions.  Others saw it as a mechanism
for detecting fraud, as noted above.  In sum, however, deterrent provisions
may all be identified by their motivation to alter the potential claimant’s
sense of priorities and to influence her to choose other means of
maintenance.
Notwithstanding the fact that the manifestation of the deterrent
rationale in many contemporary programs has departed in great measure
from the treatment that the poor were subjected to in the workhouses and
labor yards, poor law programs and contemporary programs have much in
common.  But centuries of social policy research make the modern deterrent
rationale more problematic than it may initially seem.  A quick digression is
necessary to explain why this is the case.
When programs drift from a universal to a selective criterion for
entitlement, policymakers should address at least two measures of
efficiency.98 First, a policy should be vertically efficient: the benefits
should reach those in the target group. This objective is advanced by
procedures to eliminate fraud.  Secondly, a policy should also be
horizontally efficient: a policy should try to reach a high percentage of the
95. ANNE DIGBY, The Rural Poor Law in THE NEW POOR LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
158 (Derek Fraser ed., 1976).
96. Cited in WEBB&WEBB II, supra note 50, at n.84.
97. JOYCE APPLEBY, ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND IDEOLOGY IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND
131 (1978) (quoting Richard Dunning, Preface, in A plain and easie method shewing how the office of
overseer of the poor may be managed (1686)).
98. STANDING, supra note 8, at 259.
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target group.  The decision to put a program into practice is a statement that
the administration prefers eligible candidates to, in the now-popular
vernacular, accept the “terms of the contract.” The program is put in place,
presumably because government either views entitlement to the program
under the prescribed conditions as just and fair or because it fears that if
claimants do not take part in the program, they will resort to other measures
that will leave society (and perhaps, but not necessarily, claimants
themselves) worse off.
An analysis of participation in the FSP reveals that between 1994 and
2000 the percentage of eligible participants for food stamps who
participated in the program dropped from seventy-one percent to fifty-nine
percent despite the fact that a fairly consistent number of people remained
eligible throughout the 1990s.99 Recent figures show that only forty percent
of families eligible for food stamps receive them.100 The declining levels of
participation by eligible households may help explain the puzzling trend
that, despite the booming economy at the time, the income of the poorest
families actually declined between 1995 and 1999.101 A low rate of
participation in the program creates a moral hazard and consequently a
problem that governments should address.  Indeed, it has been noted that
the purported educative and integrative objectives of the programs—to
inculcate work skills and proper work attitude—are incompatible with their
deterrent and punitive measures.102 It is important, therefore, to inquire into
the extent to which contemporary programs implement measures that deter
eligible claimants from applying for benefits.
Recent research of social assistance programs has identified several
features as deterring eligible recipients from claiming benefits to which they
are entitled.  These include means testing,103 the requirement of periodic
renewal of applications for eligibility,104 the vagueness and complexity of
99. ALLEN L. SCHIRM & LAURA A. CASTNER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD AND
NUTRITION SERVICE, REACHING THOSE IN NEED: STATE FOOD STAMP PARTICIPATION RATES IN 2000
(2002), http://www.mathematica-mpr.com/publications/PDFs/fns00rates.pdf (last visited November 16,
2008) (for statistics dating back to approximately 1998); ALLEN L. SCHIRM & LAURA A. CASTNER, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD AND NUTRITION SERVICE, REACHING THOSE IN NEED: STATE
FOOD STAMP PARTICIPATION RATES IN 1999 (2002), http://www.fns.usda.gov/oane/MENU/Published/
SNAP/FILES/Participation/1999rates.pdf (last visited November 16, 2008) (for statistics dating back to
approximately 1994).
100. HANDLER, supra note 26, at 38.
101. BOLEN, supra note 22, at 217.
102. ALAN GEWIRTH, THE COMMUNITY OF RIGHTS 129 (1996); see also Dan Finn, The Role
of Contracts and the Private Sector in Delivering Britain’s “Employment First” Welfare State, in
CONTRACTUALISM IN EMPLOYMENT SERVICES 101, 106 (Els Sol & Mies Westerveld eds.,
2005); WIM VAN OORSCHOT & JOHN SCHELL, Means-testing in Europe: A Growing Concern, in THE
SOCIOLOGY OF SOCIAL SECURITY 187, 192 (Michael Adler et al eds., 1991).
103. WIM VANOORSCHOT, REALIZING RIGHTS 17–18, 25, 271 (1995).
104. ANNE CORDEN, CHANGING PERSPECTIVES ON BENEFIT TAKE UP 22 (1995); VAN
OORSCHOT, supra note 103, at 88–94.
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eligibility rules,105 a low benefit rate,106 a structure that binds together
service and fraud surveillance, and a stereotypical and derogatory
perception of the clients.  These traits, along with remarkably high rates of
eligible individuals who are not aware of their rights, and are not informed
by the administrative agency, have been characterized as “a bureaucratic
design in deterrence.”107 The conclusion that these elements have a
deterrent effect has been corroborated by subsequent research in other
countries, including Britain.108 Critics have asserted that policymakers use
such methods as a deterrent so as to reduce the costs of the programs.109
The low take-up rate, however, has been seen to run contrary to the
“integrative aim of social policy”110 and to lead to social exclusion.  It is
important, therefore, to explain in more detail how contemporary programs
implement measures to deter eligible claimants from applying for benefits.
A. Means Tests
Far from William Beveridge’s vision for the welfare state, according to
which “no means test of any kind can be applied to the benefits of the
Scheme”111—welfare-to-work programs in every industrial country require
household income tests as a condition for benefits.  The PRWORA enlarged
the previous scope of the definition of the household for the purpose of
obtaining FSP, to include including children under twenty-one who are
married or have children.112 The Congressional Budget Office estimated
that this change would affect 150,000 food stamp households.113 The
eligibility standards for food stamps are incredibly complicated and
extensive.114 Application forms to claimants have to mirror, at least in some
respect, these provisions.  Bolen notes that:
The average length of an application is 12 pages, though it runs over twenty
pages in ten states, and reaches thirty-six pages in Minnesota.  In fact, the
average food stamp application is six times longer than the federal
application for a firearms permit and three times as long as the federal home
mortgage loan application.115
105. VANOORSCHOT, supra note 103, at 32; CORDEN, supra note 104, at 14.
106. VAN OORSCHOT, supra note 103, at 52; see also ALEX BRYSON, The Jobseekers’ Allowance:
Help or Hindrance to the Unemployed?, 24 INDUS. L.J. 204, 208 (1995).
107. PIVEN& CLOWARD, supra note 4, at 152.
108. CORDEN, supra note 104, at 7; STANDING , supra note 8, at 266.
109. CHRISTOPHER S. JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY 89, 226-228 (1992).
110. VANOORSCHOT& SCHELL, supra note 102, at 192.
111. NICHOLAS TIMMINS, FIVEGIANTS—ABIOGRAPHY OF THEWELFARE STATE 21 (1995).
112. PRWORA § 803.
113. H. COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, 104TH CONG., SUMMARY OF WELFARE REFORMS
MADE BY PUBLIC LAW 104-93 THE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND WORK OPPORTUNITY
RECONCILIATION ACT ANDASSOCIATED LEGISLATION 130 (1996).
114. See 7 U.S.C. § 2014 and § 2015 (eligible households and eligibility disqualification) (2006).
115. BOLEN, supra note 22, at 218.
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The demand for documentation to verify the details in these forms is
similarly daunting.  Thus, the complexity of the application process itself
has a deterrent effect on potential claimants.  In addition, the household
must essentially reapply at least once every six months, and if the state
agency demands—every month.116
B. Low Rates of Benefits
By way of background to the TANF reform, it is noted that AFDC
benefits lost half of their purchasing power between 1970 and 1992.117 This
was somewhat offset by the fact that food stamps maintained their
purchasing power, leaving the rate of the combined reduction in purchasing
power at twenty-seven percent.118 This changed following the 1996 welfare
reform.
Though there is room for alternative explanations, it is a suggestive
fact that while Food Stamps benefit costs decreased between 1997 and 1998
by fourteen percent in the United States, participation in the Food Stamps
program decreased by thirteen percent.119 While families in dire poverty
(below fifty percent of the poverty line) received almost sixty-six percent of
their income from means-tested programs in 1995, this percentage
plummeted to fifty-three percent in 2001.120 During that period, TANF
benefits in most American states fell below the corresponding 1994 AFDC
level.121
After adjusting for purchasing power, TANF and FSP offer single
individuals benefits at a rate that, at $130 per month, is higher only than the
Slovak Republic and Hungary amongst all OECD nations.122 For the sake
of comparison, Denmark grants $1426, the Netherlands offers $1002, and
Luxembourg grants $1053.123 Provisions for couples and lone parents are
only marginally more generous.  The United States ranking with respect to
benefits for families (couples or lone parents) with two children is identical.
Granting $466 for couples with two children and $337 for lone parents, the
United States is, again, more generous only when compared to the Slovak
Republic and to Hungary.  Acting mainly as a replacement for income,
benefits may alternatively be compared through the use of the Net
Replacement Rate (NRR) as a percentage of the wages of the average
116. 7 U.S.C. § 2015(c)(1)(D) (2006).
117. PAGE& LARNER, supra note 23, at 24.
118. PIVEN& CLOWARD, supra note 4, at 372.
119. CASTNER& ROSSO, supra note 25, at xv.
120. HANDLER& HASENFELD, supra note 61, at 55.
121. Id. at 62.
122. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), BENEFITS AND
WAGES OECD INDICATORS (2007). All benefit rates in this section signify the national rates. It is noted
that in the U.S., benefit rates vary substantially between states.
123. Id.
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production worker.  In these terms, the United States rates second lowest
for NRR for single persons (seven percent) and among the five lowest rates
for benefits granted to couples with no children (twelve percent), couples
with two children (forty-six percent) and lone parents with two children
(thirty-eight percent).124 Among countries that grant young people long term
social assistance,125 the United States’ NRR rate for young people (seven
percent) is the lowest among OECD nations.126
C. Stigmatizing Attitude Towards Recipients
Stigma and attitude towards beneficiaries are difficult traits to quantify.
And yet, stigma has been recognized as an effective deterrence from
applying for social assistance.127 Moreover, stigma may and has been
empirically attached to material factors.  Thus, Wim van Ooschot shows
how Dutch housing benefits were not associated with negative stigma partly
because one could earn 150 percent above the minimum eligibility and still
be entitled to the benefit, thus leading to a substantially higher level of take-
up.128 Similarly, it has been established that American localities that have
higher support rates also show a lower degree of personal stigma among
recipients.129 This dynamic creates a vicious circle, as governments are far
more inclined to cut benefit rates for unpopular programs whose recipients
are stigmatized.130
D. Abolition of Fraud
In order to receive grants under TANF, the state must establish and
enforce standards and procedures to combat fraud and abuse.131 If the state
does not participate in the Income and Eligibility Verification Scheme,
designed to reduce fraud, the federal Family Assistance grant to the state
will be reduced by up to two percent.132 The legislation provides that a
person found to have fraudulently misrepresented residence in order to
124. Id.
125. France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal have age limit of twenty-five and above.
Australia and New Zealand grant young people only short term assistance.
126. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), BENEFITS AND
WAGESOECD INDICATORS 39 (2002).
127. JOEL HANDLER & ELLEN HOLLINGSWORTH, Stigma, Privacy and Other Attitudes of Welfare
Recipients 22 STAN. L. REV. 1.
128. WIM VAN OORSCHOT, Troublesome Targeting: On the Multi-Level Causes of Non-Take-Up,
56 SOCIAL SECURITY 193, 201–2 (1999) [Hebrew]. Some French benefits are also characterized by high
ceilings of means testing (see PIERRE ROSANVALLON, THENEW SOCIALQUESTION 49 (2000)).
129. PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 4, at 289 (citing U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION,
ANDWELFARE, THE ADMINISTRATION OFAID TO FAMILIESWITHDEPENDENT CHILDREN INNEWYORK
CITY, NOVEMBER 1968-FEBRUARY 1969 36 (1969)).
130. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 575 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
131. PRWORA § 402(a)(6).
132. PRWORA § 409(a)(4).
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obtain assistance in two or more states will be denied assistance under
TANF, Medicaid, Food Stamps, or SSI programs, for a period of ten
years.133
In Britain, as well, an increasing level of public anxiety over the issue
of benefit abuse and fraud since the 1970s has culminated in the 1997
Green Paper dedicated to the matter134 and in the Social Security
Administration (Fraud) Act 1997 that immediately followed.  The SSA(F)A
marked the opening of a new era in government determination to eradicate
fraud and abuse.  The Act empowered officials with greater authority and
changed the balance between the public interest in detecting fraud and
abuse, on the one hand, and claimants’ rights to privacy, on the other hand,
in a manner that has been criticized as inappropriate.135 Both the American
and the British governments’ increased vigilance and reduced tolerance
towards fraud, along with the potential violation of the beneficiaries’ right
to privacy, have served as efficient mechanisms of deterrence.136
IV.
CONDITIONING FOR SOCIAL CONTROL
The Poor Law concept of “residuum,” like that of the present day
“underclass,” views causes of unemployment and poverty as related to
behavior and morality.137 A contractual model is beneficial to organs that
have in mind behavior modification as it converts “diffuse, non-specific
expectations into more specific and concrete obligations”.138 Following the
logic that the contract is the foundation of the rules, and that rules dictate
behavior,139 governments turned to inspect what rules are needed so as to
change behavior of asocial welfare claimants.  Thus, social conservatives in
the United States argued that since AFDC caused women to have children
out of wedlock and families to break-up, the “Contract with America” needs
to fuse a work oriented agenda with a behavior-modification agenda.140
Social welfare can, under this paradigm, demand claimants to change their
values, attitudes and behavior in return for assistance.141 There is a danger
here, however.  Esping-Anderson notes that a characteristic trait of Fascist
133. PRWORA § 408(a)(8).
134. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SECURITY, BEATING FRAUD IS EVERYONE’S BUSINESS (1997).
135. GRAINNE MCKEEVER Detecting, Prosecuting and Punishing Benefit Fraud 62 MODERN L.
REV. 261 (1999).
136. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SECURITY A New Contract for Welfare: Safeguarding Social
Security (1999); GRAINNE MCKEEVER, Fighting Fraud: An Evaluation of the Government’s Social
Security Fraud Strategy 21 J. OF SOCIALWELFARE AND FAMILY LAW 357 (1999).
137. CHRIS JONES& TONYNOVAK, POVERTY, WELFARE AND THE DISCIPLINARY STATE 73 (1999).
138. FREEDLAND& KING, supra note 10, at 468.
139. CHARLESMURRAY, THE EMERGING BRITISHUNDERCLASS 25 (1990).
140. C NOBLE, WELFARE ASWEKNOW IT 127 (1997).
141. JONES&NOVAK, supra note 137, at 80.
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regimes was the conditionality of social rights conditional on loyalty and
morality, seeking to invigorate the workforce while reinstalling the
principle of moral desert.142
But there are other approaches which, at least facially, seek to connect
moral and cultural norms to the task at hand, namely, moving the able
bodied unemployed into the labor force.  The importance of these
approaches lies in the way they connect popular perceptions on poverty and
the reasons for unemployment to the collective response in the form of
institutionalized welfare systems.
The first approach focuses on the importance of work as a moral
endeavor,143 sometimes even endowing it with reverent religious attributes,
“the power to save the soul.”144 A second approach perceives the culture of
unemployment as the cause for unemployment, and therefore justifies the
conditioning of welfare benefits on moral behavior.145 The third approach
views the culture of unemployment as the result of unemployment, and
addresses asocial behavior through conditioning relief.
Though quite clear in theory, the distinction between the first and
second approach does not manifest itself neatly when analyzing the
legislation and policy.  Both approaches concentrate on the moral attributes
of the unemployed and view a productive life as morally superior to a life
of “indolence, improvidence or vice.”146 It is difficult to determine whether
the perceived moral authority of a life of gainful employment is derived
from the paramount value of work as an end in itself, or as the natural
consequence of living a decent, and thus productive, life.147 The two
approaches will therefore be addressed together.  This subsection concludes
with an analysis of a significant and distinguishable moral agenda—the
paternalistic attitude towards welfare recipients.  Though it may have much
in common with some of the other approaches, such as the clear concept of
the good life that one should strive towards, its peculiarities merit separate
exploration.  I shall therefore deal with the moral rationale under three
headings: moral correction as the avenue to work, welfare provision as a
means of addressing moral concerns, and paternalism.
A. Moral Correction as the Avenue to Work
This perception views a productive life as one of the important
142. GOSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM 40
(1990).
143. HANDLER, supra note 26, at 21-22.
144. JASONDEPARLE, AMERICAN DREAM: THREE WOMEN, TEN KIDS, AND A NATION’S
DRIVE TO END WELFARE 162 (2004); MACAROV, supra note 55.
145. MURRAY, supra note 139.
146. Poor Law Report, supra note 77, at 264 (emphasis added).
147. See similarly FRASER, supra note 5, at 134 (discussing whether “moral degradation of the poor
was a consequence of their housing condition . . . [or] the other way round”).
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common traits of a decent citizen in a decent society.  If an offer of work is
rejected, this view finds fault in the different set of moral and cultural
values that the claimant possesses.148 Thus, the New Poor Law sought to
modify the behavior of the poor and unemployed by holding them to a strict
disciplinary regime within the workhouse.  This was justified on the basis
that “it has been found that the pauperism of the greater number of [able-
bodied individuals] originated in indolence, improvidence or vice, and
might have been averted by ordinary care and industry.”149 For those who
were previously employed, it seemed even more clearclearer that “their way
of life had been anchored in the discipline of work, and so that discipline
had to be restored.”150 The way to do so was to shift “from direct relief to
work relief”.151
The moralistic practice during the workhouse era was quite crude: the
pauper was to be removed from his corrupting “natural” environment and
placed in an environment conducive to forming a character that would meet
society’s expectations.  He would be subject to a system of labor discipline
and restraint that, even when not inhumane, required him to adhere to the
principle of less eligibility and, thus, be less attractive than the life of the
independent laborer.152
The moral agenda of the poor law included the idea of enhancing male
responsibility and punishing “‘intemperate’ marriages and births outside
wedlock” that were seen as “responsible for overpopulation and the
pauperization of the labouring classes.”153 But within this practice of
removing paupers from their home, there is a clash amongst the rationales
that supposedly underpin poor law policies.  Some regions adopted policies
such as sending men to one institution and women and children to
another.154 Children above the age of five were required to work so as “to
prevent an idle, lazy kind of life, which if once they get the habit of, they
will hardly leave.”155 Youth were subject to a similar treatment so as to
ensure that they “may[] be accustomed and brought up in [l]abour[] . . . and
[w]ork[]”.156
This scenario is troubling since, then as now, those who explain
148. MACAROV, supra note 55, at 124; Quigley, supra note 4, at 105–6.
149. Poor Law Report, supra note 77, at 264 (emphasis added).
150. PIVEN& CLOWARD, supra note 4, at 80–81.
151. Id.
152. DEAKIN&WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 141.
153. DEAKIN&WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 145.
154. DIGBY, supra note 95, at 153–4. In fact, such a policy was actually prescribed by the Poor
Law Commissioners of 1832–1834, and those regions that applied the ‘mixed workhouse’ scheme did so
knowing that they were deviating from that standard.  The Webbs view the prevalence of this deviation
as one of the reasons the system as a whole was eventually abandoned (see WEBB & WEBB II, supra
note 50, at 376–7).
155. APPLEBY, supra note 97, at 141.
156. Poor Law Act, 1576, 18 Eliz. 1, c. 3 (Eng.).
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unemployment through reference to moral and cultural norms consider the
break-up of family ties to be intimately linked to problems of poverty and
unemployment.157 Indeed, it has been observed that “life in the workhouse
was the antithesis of the domestic ideal: families were fragmented, women
worked, and men did not provide for their families.”158 One may wonder if
the modern “man in the house” rules, which deny aid to a mother who is
associated with a man in any way, do not have a similar negative effect.
Dealing with unemployment by forcibly breaking up families, it should be
concluded, undermines the goals of the programs.159
The idea that destitution may be attributed to personal irresponsibility
offered justification for poor law measures, including the workhouse.160
Then as now, the beneficiary was understood to lack the aptitude that
enabled his fellow man to assume responsibility for himself and his loved
ones.  Thus, “the offer of the [Work]House” compelled “the able[-]bodied
[man] to assume responsibility for the able[-]bodied period in his life.”161
These themes have become a central to modern welfare reforms.162
Examining provisions of contemporary programs, the moral desert of
beneficiaries has become an increasingly important condition for
entitlement.  As Lucy Williams argues, “only those women and children
who conform to majoritarian middle-class values deserve government
subsistence”.163
Welfare-to-work schemes have been criticized for seeking to reinstate
the traditional roles in the family and to re-establish the prominent,
normative role that a family had in society.164 It is possible to suggest two
scenarios that the programs putatively address, both of which stem from the
lone mother’s refusal to marry the father of her children.  Her refusal is
justified because the financial incentives to marry are missing, and because
the male in question is not an attractive prospect.  He is, according to
conservative writings, a “barbarian,” pure and simple.165 The first scenario,
then, views the welfare system as instrumental in “taming barbarians;”:
transforming them into attractive and worthy partners.  As Charles Murray
157. MURRAY, supra note 139.
158. MARJORIE LEVINE-CLARK, Engendering Relief: Women, Ablebodiedness, and the New Poor
Law in Early Victorian England, 11.4 J. OFWOMEN’SHISTORY 107, 122 (2000).
159. A more sinister explanation is that poor men and women were segregated to prevent the
“unfit” from having children. BRIAN BARRY, WHY SOCIAL JUSTICE MATTERS 135 (2005).
160. See DEAKIN, supra note 41, at 12.
161. Cited in WEBB&WEBB II, supra note 50, at 441–2.
162. LAWRENCE MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT 82-88 (1986) (advocating “the need for
authority” and compelling welfare beneficiaries to assume responsibility by entering the workforce for
their own good).
163. WILLIAMS, supra note 28, at 720-21.
164. GROVER& STEWART, supra note 55, at 148-74.
165. Cited in KIRK MANN & SASHA ROSENEIL Some Mothers Do ‘Ave ‘Em: Backlash and the
Gender Politics of the Underclass Debate 3 J. OFGENDER STUD. 317, 323 (1994).
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intimates, “young males are essentially barbarians for whom marriage—
meaning not just the wedding vows—is an indispensable civilizing force.
Young men who don’t work don’t make good marriage material.”166
Taming the barbarians and socializing young men into their pre-ordained
roles in the workforce and in society is seen as the moral notion underlying
the programs.167
The second scenario recognizes that such social engineering may not
always succeed.  The alternative is to assure that the lone mother will take
up functions traditionally associated with the male role model.  Sociologist
AH Halsey explains that this is because:
[T]he very, very important ingredient of a role model of a working man, a
person who goes to work and comes back and does all sorts of DIY and is a
responsible adult person is missing.  And that seems to be a way of making
sure you don’t have barbarism.168
If rising rates of divorce and “illegitimate” births cannot be controlled,
then pressure should be applied so that the child will see the mother leaving
for work on a daily basis.  It is suggested that this is the hidden agenda
underlying schemes that focus on lone parents.169
B. Addressing the Symptoms
It has been repeatedly noted, by scholars on both sides of the political
spectrum, that long term dependency is associated with unfavorable
symptoms such as social exclusion, lower levels of education, vagrancy,
alcoholism and drug abuse.170 Conditioning welfare, then, may advance
society’s conception of the good life by modifying this destructive
behavior.  Charitably, this approach is paternalistic; society employs an
existing mechanism to reach out to socially excluded groups and improve
their condition.  A more cynical perspective would view this approach as
preoccupied with “social control and the moral improvement of the lower
orders.”171 This approach was arguably dominant in the mindset of poor
law policy makers, who “thought instinctively in terms of controlling the
lives of those beneath them.”172 Indeed, Piven and Cloward advance an
even more troubling thesis, that social control driven by fear of revolt is a
foundational explanation for the institution and expansion of public relief.
In this they cite the Hammonds:
If compassion was not a strong enough force to make the ruling classes
166. CHARLESMURRAY, THE EMERGING BRITISH UNDERCLASS 23 (1990).
167. GROVER& STEWART, supra note 55, at 96–112.
168. MANN&ROSENEIL, supra note 165.
169. GROVER& STEWART, supra note 55, at 55–57, 76–86.
170. HANDLER, supra note 26, at 210; DOUGLAS BESHAROV, The End of Welfare as We Know It?
111 PUBLIC INTEREST 95 (1993)
171. KIM LAWES, PATERNALISM AND POLITICS 66 (2000).
172. DAVID ROBERTS, PATERNALISM IN EARLY VICTORIAN ENGLAND 61–62 (1979).
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attend to the danger that the poor might starve, fear would certainly have
made them think of the danger that the poor might rebel . . . . Thus fear and
pity united to sharpen the wits of the rich, and to turn their minds to the
distresses of the poor.173
The attempt to change the social attitude and behavior of beneficiaries,
referred to as the “problematic marriage of social engineering with
individual freedom,”174 did not cease with the passing of the poor laws.
While vagrancy was a central concern in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, modern social concerns center around loose sexual conduct and
the break-up of families.  Moreover, these are issues that can be dealt with
through the vehicle of welfare provision. Thus, Frank Field, discussing
Britain, suggests that as Christian morality becomes unsustainable, “[t]he
distribution of welfare is one of the great teaching forces open to advanced
societies.”175 Charles Murray is a prime exponent of this agenda, arguing
that “illegitimacy is the single most important social problem of our
time . . . because it drives everything else.”176
It is not always easy to determine whether the process of moral
correction is done with the purpose of social control in mind, or for the
bettering of the lower orders themselves.  Thus, the Medical Assistant
Commissioner, after reporting the grave hygiene conditions that the poor
experienced, opined that “beneficiaries must be compelled to obedience
alike in their own and in the public interest.”177 A similar ambivalence is
found in President Roosevelt’s Congressional Address, in which he
explained why direct relief should be abolished in favor of relief
conditioned on work.  Moving between the concern for the individual and
the interest of the nation, he explained:
Continued dependence upon relief induces a spiritual and moral
disintegration fundamentally destructive to the national fiber . . . . We must
preserve not only the bodies of the unemployed from destitution but also
their self-respect, their self reliance and courage and determination.178
Turning our attention now to the details of the moral agenda of the
American welfare-to-work program now in force, we find that the same
normative ideas are quite explicit.  Indeed, the PRWORA opens with the
following statement:179
173. PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 4, at 20–21 (quoting J.L. HAMMOND AND BARBARA
HAMMOND, THEVILLAGE LABOURER 118 (1948)).
174. PETERVINCENT-JONES, THENEW PUBLICCONTRACTING 265 (2006).
175. FRANK FIELD, A Rejoinder, in STAKEHOLDER WELFARE 107, 111 (Alan Deacon ed.,
1996).
176. CHARLES MURRAY, The Coming White Underclass, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Oct. 29,
1993, at A14.
177. FIELD, supra note 175, at 111; see also ALAN DEACON, The Case for Compulsion 98 Poverty
8–10 (1997).
178. PIVEN& CLOWARD, supra note 4, at 94.
179. PRWORA § 101.
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Sec. 101 Findings
The Congress makes the following findings:
Marriage is the foundation of a successful society.
Marriage is an essential institution of a successful society which promotes
the interests of children.
Promotion of responsible fatherhood and motherhood is integral to
successful child rearing and the well-being of children. . .
. . .
The number of individuals receiving aid to families with dependent children
(. . . AFDC) has more than tripled since 1965. . . . Eighty-nine percent of
children receiving AFDC benefits now live in homes in which no father is
present.
The increase of out-of-wedlock pregnancies is well documented . . .
. . . The increase of teenage pregnancies among the youngest girls is
particularly severe and is linked to predatory sexual practices by men who
are significantly older.
The negative consequences of an out-of-wedlock birth on the mother, the
child, the family and society are well documented . . .
As for the amendment to the Social Security Act (SSA) itself, section
401(a) of the Act now reads as follows:
Sec. 401 Purpose
(a) The purpose of this part is to increase the flexibility of States in
operating a program to
Provide assistance to needy families . . .
End the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting
job preparation, work, and marriage.
Prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies . . .
Encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families.180
Thus, it should not be surprising that some provisions of welfare-to-
work programs, state and federal, do not address unemployment benefits or
work requirements at all, but rather strictly moral matters.  In some states,
such as New Jersey and Wisconsin, “wedfare” programs encourage
claimants to “feel responsible” for their children by offering supplementary
allowances if parents get married.181 Indeed, one proclaimed target of
contemporary measures outlined below is the non-normative family, and
especially the single parent family, and their objectives are mainly to re-
establish a particular idea of the family as the preferred domestic structure.
Work, then, would “transform family structure, community life and . . .
180. PRWORA § 401.
181. ROSANVALLON, supra note 128, at 102.
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would restore the social fabric.”182 In addition, other provisions refer to the
non-normative and asocial behavior of recipients in general, behavior that is
not directly (or at times not at all) related to employment.  These are some
central elements of current program that advance certain moral agenda:
 Minor Parent not in School: A certain variation of what was known as
Learnfare programs is established under TANF.  Under this provision, the
state will not grant assistance to an individual who is under the age of
eighteen, unmarried, has a minor child at least twelve weeks old and has not
successfully completed high school or its equivalent, unless the individual
participates in either educational activities directed towards attainment of a
high school diploma or its equivalent, or in alternative education or training
schemes approved by the state.183 Evaluations of such programs suggest
that their impact, if any, was limited.  In Wisconsin, for example, where
Learnfare was first initiated, the program had no effect on improving school
attendance.184
 Minor Parent in Adult-Supervising Setting: The state may not grant
TANF funds to provide assistance to an unmarried individual who is under
the age of eighteen and is caring for a child if the minor parent and child are
not residing with a parent, legal guardian, or other adult relative of the
individual, subject to limited exceptions.185 Research on the living
arrangement provision is limited and conclusions are mixed. 186 Alongside
evidence that teen mothers who lived with their parents obtained more
schooling, other studies have shown a decrease in enrollment and
graduation and an increase in depression among teens living in a three-
generation household.187
 Illegitimacy: The federal government requires states to establish goals
and take action to prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock
pregnancies, with special emphasis on teenage pregnancies, for the calendar
years 1998 through to 2005.188 In addition, bonuses are granted to states
that demonstrate a net decrease in out-of-wedlock births.189 The SSA
provides that $50 million per year will be allocated to the states for a period
of five years for abstinence-only programs for teens and unmarried
adults.190 Moreover, the reauthorization of TANF, under the DRA of 2005,
182. PIVEN& CLOWARD, supra note 4, at 392-93.
183. PRWORA § 408(a)(4).
184. JODIE LEVIN-EPSTEIN & JOHN HUTCHINS, CTR. FOR L. & SOC. POL’Y, TEENS AND TANF:
HOW ADOLESCENTS FARE UNDER THE NATION’S WELFARE PROGRAM 4 (2003), http://www.clasp.org/
publications/ Teens_TANF.pdf (last visited November 23, 2008).
185. PRWORA § 408(a)(5).
186. LEVIN-EPSTEIN& HUTCHINS, supra note 184, at 3.
187. LEVIN-EPSTEIN& HUTCHINS, supra note 184, at 3.
188. PRWORA § 402(a)(1)(A)(v).
189. PRWORA § 403(a)(1)(E)(2).
190. PRWORA § 912 (Abstinence Education, replacing Sec. 510 of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. 701).
132 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW Vol. 29:2
includes $150 million per year (2006 to 2010) to promote responsible
fatherhood.191
 Family Cap: One of the more popular, and more controversial,
measures enacted by state legislatures under the previous waiver system
was carried into the framework of the PRWORA.  The family cap,
sardonically referred to as “contraceptive welfare laws,”192 denies lone
mothers benefits they would have been entitled to due to the birth of a new
child, if they gave birth to the child while on welfare.193 This measure
exhibits the most direct manifestation of the public perception of the lone
mother on welfare who engages in illicit sexual relations and gets pregnant
so as to receive benefits.194 Though the federal law makes no mention of
family cap schemes, it permits states to continue to implement the welfare
programs that were in place under the waiver scheme.195 Many legislatures
saw this as a green light to carry on with such policies as the family cap.196
As with Learnfare, there is no data to show that states that have
employed family cap schemes under the waiver system have seen a drop in
the size of AFDC families.197 Furthermore, such families have substantially
decreased in size during the twenty years prior to the implementation of the
schemes.  In 1969, 32.5 percent of AFDC families had four or more
children, while only 9.9 percent had four or more children in 1990.198 The
average AFDC family in 1990 had 2.9 members (including adults) and 72.5
percent of AFDC families had one or two children.199 Moreover, studies
show that the ability to receive benefits had no effect on an AFDC mother’s
decision to have a child.200 As such data have accumulated, a number of
states have either eliminated the family cap or are beginning to phase it
out.201
 Penalty for Non-Cooperation in Obtaining Child Support: If an
191. Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) § 7103, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006).
192. DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, The Only Good Poor Woman: Unconstitutional Conditions and
Welfare, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 931, 932 (1995) (arguing welfare policies that interfere with poor
women’s reproductive choices violate the unconstitutional conditions doctrine).
193. Id.
194. VICKY LENS, Welfare Reform and the Family Cap: Rhetoric versus Reality, 4 J. OF CHILDREN
AND POVERTY, 19 (1998)
195. PRWORA § 415.
196. See N.B. v. Sybinski, 724 N.E.2d.1103, 1106-07 (Ct. App. 2000) (Indiana’s family cap was
intended to reduce fertility of welfare beneficiaries thereby lowering the number of children born into a
dependent situation).
197. HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 61, at 302; WILLIAMS, supra note 28, at 737-40 (noting
that empirical studies refute a correlation between women’s childbearing decisions and AFDC benefits).
198. WILLIAMS, supra note 28, at 738.
199. Id., at 737
200. WILLIAMS, supra note 28, at 737-40 (noting that empirical studies refute a correlation between
women’s childbearing decisions and AFDC benefits).
201. JODIE LEVIN-EPSTEIN, CTR. FOR L. & SOC. POL’Y, LIFTING THE LID OFF THE FAMILY CAP:
STATES REVISIT PROBLEMATIC POLICY FOR WELFARE MOTHERS 4, (2003),
http://clasp.org/publications/family_cap_brf.pdf (last visited November 23, 2008).
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individual fails to cooperate with the state in establishing paternity or in
establishing or enforcing a child support order without showing good cause
, the state will deduct no less than twenty-five percent and potentially deny
assistance altogether.202 This deduction or denial of service deprives the
individual’s family of funds that they would otherwise receive.
 Drug Use: The PRWORA contains a provision permanently denying
cash assistance and food stamps to anyone convicted under state or federal
law of a felony offense that “has as an element the possession, use, or
distribution of a controlled substance.”203 If an individual is denied benefits
under this provision and is part of a family that receives TANF assistance,
the amount of assistance the family receives will be reduced by the amount
that the offending individual would have received in assistance.204 Food
stamp benefits have a similar provision.  The deterrent effects of these
provisions seems questionable given the fact that in some states drug
offenders already face the threat of life in prison without parole.205 Instead,
it seems that a moralistic approach guided the insert of the provision into
PRWORA.  As Senator Phil Gramm, who proposed this amendment to the
PRWORA, explained: “I don’t believe that people who are using drugs and
who are selling drugs should be getting welfare . . . It’s a tough provision
but it’s time to get tough”.206
C. Paternalism
Since the poor law era, paternalism has been perceived as “the most
straightforward justification for conditionality.”207 The uniqueness of the
paternalistic approach lies in its attitude to welfare claimants.  In a sense,
paternalism may be understood as a concrete policy that manifests “the
value of reciprocal relations and mutual obligation translated into a holistic,
great chain of being . . . .”208 Indeed, leading up the early twentieth century,
poor law authorities habitually instructed claimants not only how to spend
the money granted to them, but also how to conduct other aspects of their
lives as well:
The ‘principles of 1907’ embody the doctrine of a mutual obligation
between the individual and the community.  The universal maintenance of a
definite minimum of civilized life . . . becomes the joint responsibility of an
202. PRWORA § 408(a)(1)(B)(2).
203. PRWORA § 115(a).
204. PRWORA § 115(a)(1).
205. Note, Recent Legislation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 983, 988 (1997).
206. Id. at 986.
207. ALAN DEACON, An Ethic of Mutual Responsibility? Towards a Fuller Justification for
Conditionality, in Welfare in WELFARE REFORM AND POLITICAL THEORY 127, 131 (Christopher Beem
and Lawrence Mead eds., 2005).
208. LAWES, supra note 171, at 48 (quoting nineteenth century English paternal idealist Michael
Thomas Sadler).
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indissoluble partnership, such as the duty to treat the sick and educate the
children.  The inevitable complement of this corporate responsibility is
placed on the individual to keep her children in health and send them to
school.209
This attitude differs from the efficiency approach that immediately
follows, and from the other moral perspectives identified in this section.
First, while an efficiency approach would assumes the existence of, and
grants credence to, an individual’s ability to act rationally, i.e. in
accordance with economic incentives, paternalism sees its justification
precisely on the grounds that people will not act rationally.  With respect to
wage-work, the economic paradigm will stress the monetary incentives and
disincentives to prefer work to benefits, while the paternalistic approach
suggests that sometimes individuals need to be forced to maximize their
own well-being.  But paternalism is also unique as a moral approach.  The
policies discussed above suggest that the root cause for the poor’s
deprivation is their own moral character.  Their different set of priorities
leads them to prefer idleness and vice to productive wage-work.  Re-
educating them by addressing the moral flaws (or by simply cutting their
entitlement) will result in beneficial material results, for them and for
society.210
The paternalistic approach, on the other hand, assumes that the no such
disparity in moral sensibilities exists.  The poor and the welfare recipient
simply lack the will power choose the better life.  Therefore, they should be
forced to be free.211 Incidentally, the latterthis perspective is supported by
studies that reveal that unemployed men and women exhibit attitudes
favorable to wage labor at least to the same extent as working people, and
often—to a greater extent.212 And yet, the conclusion need not be that
welfare beneficiaries should be forced to work. In fact, studies show that
up to forty-six percent of welfare mothers do work, at least intermittently,
even though they do not always report their income.213 While this practice
may not be laudable, it certainly shows that these women do not lack
personal responsibility or will power.  Moreover, the indignation directed
towards this combination of work and benefits should be tempered by the
fact that low wages and meager benefits force many beneficiaries to
combine the two, to make ends meet.214
209. SIDNEYWEBB& BEATRICEWEBB, ENGLISH POOR LAW POLICY 270 (1963); see alsoWEBB&
WEBB II, supra note 50, at 613–4 (critiquing the parental responsibility policy that was in place at the
beginning of the twentieth century).
210. MURRAY, supra note 65 (1984).
211. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIALCONTRACT I.vii, II.iv (1998)
212. ELIZABETH ANDERSON, Welfare, Work Requirements, and Dependent-Care, 21 J. OF APPLIED
PHILOSOPHY 243, 249–50 (2004); MEAD, supra note 162, at 79-80.
213. ANNE L. ALSTOTT, Work vs. Freedom: A Liberal Challenge to Employment Subsidies, 108
YALE L.J. 967, 992-93 (1999).
214. MCKEEVER, supra note 136 at 366.
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The paternalist attitude, then, was as prominent during the poor law era
as it is today. The Poor Law Report of 1832–1834, which provided the basis
for the New Poor Law, described the impact the workhouse has on the
pauper.  Through the workhouse,
new life, new energy is infused into the constitution of the pauper; he is
aroused like one from sleep, his relation with all his neighbors, high and
low, is changed; he surveys his former employers with new eyes.  He begs a
job—he will not take a denial. . .215
Desmond King overlooks the paternalistic undertone of the passage
and characterizes it as deterrence.216 But such is not the case.  The view
reflected in the 1834 report is on par with the view advocated by a
contemporary proponent of a paternalistic approach to welfare, Lawerence
Mead.  Mead views the poor as “dutiful but defeated.” Though the poor are
naturally inclined to work, they are exposed to a welfare system that leads
to “the degradation of the character of the labouring class.”217 Instead, the
system should create incentives to work by conditioning benefits.218 Both
Mead and the Poor Law Commissioners view the poor as children, who
should be shown the right path.  Unable to assess their economic options
rationally, the poor are dependent on the state to step in and impart their
authority on them.  Hegel endorsed this approach:
[S]ociety has the duty and right to act as guardian on behalf of those who
destroy the security of their own and their family’s livelihood by
extravagance, and to implement their end and that of society in their
place.219
Ross Cranston identifies under the Old Poor Law “the idea of a
paternal ruling class which regarded the maintenance of the poor as part of
their duty.”220 He describes the case of one William Amarys who, as he
“hath behaved himself very rudely and irreligiously in the church,”221 saw
his weekly sums cut by half.  The similarity to an adult granting a child
allowance, and then refusing to pay because the child “behaved badly,” can
hardly be more straightforward. Fraser explains this rationale explicitly,
stating that “[s]ociety was acting like the loving parent inflicting sharp,
painful punishment on the miscreant child—being cruel to be kind.  The
child, like the pauper, resented the short term discomfort, but benefited
215. Poor Law Report, supra note 77, at 247-48 (emphasis added).
216. KING, IN THENAME OF LIBERALISM, supra note 17, at 227.
217. DEAKIN&WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 133 (citing the 1824 Select Committee).
218. LAWRENCE MEAD, Welfare Employment, in THE NEW PATERNALISM 39 (Lawrence Mead
ed., 1997); ALANDEACON, PERSPECTIVES ON WELFARE 49-63 (2002).
219. GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 264,
§240 (H.B. Nisbet trans.,1991); see also JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY Bk.II, §12.11 (“Of Popular Remedies for Low Wages”) (1977) (arguing in favor of an
attitude characterized by “enforced rigidity of discipline” towards the poor).
220. CRANSTON, supra note 13, at 35.
221. Id. at  36.
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from the long-term improvement in character.”222
V.
CONDITIONING FOR EFFICIENCY
No account of historical or contemporary welfare-to-work programs
would be complete without consideration of the fuel that drives the
machine: money.  But when costs are considered, two perspectives should
be distinguished.  The “macro” perspective analyzes costs and efficiency
gains (potential and actual) from the state’s point of view.  If benefit costs
present an unbearable burden on the state budget, for example, some may
argue that benefits need to be cut (at least temporarily), regardless of the
consequences for beneficiaries.223 From a “micro” perspective, the focus is
on the individual’s decision making process.  Beneficiaries are perceived as
rational maximizers, who behave rationally when they maximize their own
self-interest.  If the state wishes to realize certain policy goals, it must
arrange monetary incentives and disincentives accordingly.  Arguments that
are of interest in this subsection may be termed interchangeably as
“efficiency,” “utilitarian,” “fiscal” and “economic” all denote an approach
that focuses on the pragmatic, rational and efficient use of resources,
monetary as well as human.
In fact, just as some poor law measures were not effectively executed
because of excessive costs of implementation,224 spiraling costs are cited as
a major motivation for contemporary welfare reform. During the 1980s, a
consensus seemed to develop in the U.S. and Britain around the notion that
welfare payments had led to a fiscal crisis.225 Thus, welfare needed to be
reformed by reducing the level and duration of benefits, raising
contributions rates and tightening conditions for entitlements. The fiscal
rationale was integrated into the goals of the programs, which now include
reducing the number of the unemployed claiming benefits, reducing the
budget expenditures for welfare payments, increasing the flexibility of the
local labor market and exploiting the available human resources.
To effectively convey the economic approach’s impact on welfare
reform, it is useful to return to employ the aforementioned distinction
between the micro level and the macro level.  As noted, on the micro level,
beneficiaries are perceived to be motivated predominantly by pecuniary
incentives and disincentives.  This view had gained popularity over the
decades, culminating in a contemporary discourse that warns policy makers
222. FRASER, supra note 5, at 47.
223. This was precisely the argument that brought about significant benefit cuts in Israel in 2003.
224. DEAKIN&WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 113.
225. STANDING, supra note 8, at 228, 253.
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against granting benefits that would lead to an “unemployment trap.”226
The implication is that as long as benefits remain above a minimal market
wages, the unemployed, behaving rationally, would continue receiving
benefits and never enter the labor force.227 As far as this discourse is
concerned, values, stigma and social exclusion do not enter into the
analysis.  The idea that social norms “provide a cognitive frame of
reference through which group members interpret and judge their
environment . . . [and] a basis for distinguishing good from bad”228 is
dismissed as romantic naiveté.  Thus, one seventeenth century writer
protested that “the Poor, if Two Days work will maintain them, will not
work three.”229 The poor law principle of less eligibility, which requires
one to compare the unemployed to the lowest of the laborer class, naturally
emanates from such a paradigm.
The macro level of the economic rationale focuses on the goal of
increasing society’s wealth and is concerned with the wasting waste
ofhuman resources, human and other.  Joyce Appleby finds that welfare
reform policy in seventeenth century England was not focused on the loss
to the national economy accrued due to the sums paid from the public
purse, but rather on the fact that the able-bodied individuals were not
included in the labor force.  She states that viewing the poor as a source of
labor “represents the infusion of the outlook of those who had embraced the
productive ideal into public thinking on charity.”230 Appleby finds
compelling evidence that the government’s theory of economic growth and
development took precedence over immediate concerns with the distress of
the poor or the exactions of the poor rate. 231
The most straightforward example of economic measures in poor law
programs is the public works schemes, which were formed to enable the
poor to be “encouraged, and mercifully dealt with, and kindly used.”232
Appleby notes the wide range of projects embarked upon with poor relief
money, including “a fishery, the draining of fens, clearing of wastelands,
working up of flax or spinning the wheel by thousands of poor whose
misery could be exchanged for a supportive competence.”233 The
226. GUY STANDING, The Road to Workfare, 129 INT’L LAB. REV. 677, 684 (1990)
227. HUGH COLLINS, KEITH D. EWING & AILEEN MCCOLGAN, LABOUR LAW: TEXT AND
MATERIALS 466 (2001).
228. H. ANDREWMICHENER& JOHN D. DELAMATER, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 352 (3 ed., 1994);
for a more sophisticated approach to law and economics see CHRISTINE JOLLS, CASS SUNSTEIN &
RICHARD THALER, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998)
(advancing an approach that “reflects a better understanding of human behavior and its wellsprings” Id.,
at 1473).
229. APPLEBY, supra note 97, at 145 (quoting GARDINER, SOME REFLECTIONS ON A PAMPHLET, 16-
17 (1697)).
230. APPLEBY, supra note 97, at 151.
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accomplishments of the Work Progress Administration (WPA) under
President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal were even more impressive.
Within a five year span, the WPA completed “the construction or
renovation of 110,000 public buildings, 600 airports, 600,000 miles of
roads, and 116,000 bridges and viaducts.”234 At times, this logic was taken
to its extreme, as when parish children were seen as “an ideal labor source
for new manufacturers” thus creating a system of ‘“free’ child labor.”235
Piven and Cloward reveal that factories began to relocate to towns where
they could “employ” local children.236 Moreover, young paupers were
shipped to remote factories, to take advantage of the streams from which
the power was drawn.237
Another form of work-benefits fusion was the famous Speenhamland
system.  Under this structure, parish funds complemented sub-minimum
wages in the labor market.  The parish would send the pauper to a farmer
and pay the difference between the wages the pauper received and the
allowance to which he was entitled.238
From a modern perspective, Speenhamland is generally viewed as a
failed experiment.  Some stress the fact that the program generally benefited
employers and depressed wages, while “increas[ing] the attraction of
pauperism precisely at the juncture when a man was straining to escape the
fate of the destitute.”239 Others have judged the system as espousing
“principles of pre-commidification since it . . . [was] designed to establish
market hegemony in the distribution of welfare.”240 Using benefit
beneficiaries as labor for public works schemes and to provide public
services, also had ramifications on the level of wages in the labor market.
Contemporary scholars note that the Speenhamland program not only
negatively affected beneficiaries, but also increased the polarization of the
labor market by “creating a cheap pool of forced labour”, by harming the
negotiating position of low-wage workers and depressing wages.241
The popularity of the Speenhamland programs stemmed from the fact
that the government was able to exploit all the available resources.  This
opportunity is was tempting not only because it alloweds governments to
save funds on domestic projects, but also to increase the ability to compete
with foreign markets.  Ross Cranston notes that this line of thought goes
back to the erection of the poor houses in the seventeenth century,
234. PIVEN& CLOWARD, supra note 4, at 97.
235. Id. at 28.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. DEAKIN&WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 128–29.
239. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 99 (1944).
240. ESPING-ANDERSEN, supra note 142, at 36.
241. KING, Actively Seeking Work?, supra note 8, at 159 (citing NATIONALURBAN COALITION AND
THE LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, FALLING DOWN ON THE JOB 59-60 (1971);
PIVEN& CLOWARD, supra note 4, at chs. 4-5.
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historically inspired by the need to compete with Dutch commerce through
the use of low wages.242 Despite disagreement over the program, the
Speenhamland system stayed in place until the New Poor Law’s Labour
Test Order (1842) and Relief Regulation Order (1852) directed that no
relief should be given to a person who is employed.243
Both sides of the political and economic sphere have lodged criticism
against the synthesis of wage labor and relief.  Those prone to laissez faire
ideology had their own critique of the Public Work and Speenhamland
schemes.  Not only were these programs more costly than simply
distributing benefits, but they also extended the range of government
activity into areas traditionally preserved for private enterprise.244 A
different argument stressed the fact that wages and relief are governed by
two different justifications.  While the wage laborer was entitled to
compensation for his daily toil, relief claimants should be offered assistance
on the basis of their need, even if these beneficiaries were workhouse
inhabitants who were assigned labor.  This was noted by charity
organizations such as the Charity Organisation Society:
Labour . . . is an excellent thing . . . . But . . . it must be labour subjected to
the true conditions of labour . . . Charity is also an excellent thing, but . . .
when . . . labour and charity are mixed up together, great abuse and
demoralisation are always engendered . . . . 245
With such a rare historical consensus on the ineffectiveness of the
Speenhamland program in mind, it is interesting to note that numerous
Western countries are experimenting today with initiatives that combine
work and benefits.
Relief itself, of course, has always been also subject to criticism.
Indeed, contemporary American welfare legislation reveals with admirable
candor that one of the main objectives of welfare reform is to lower costs,
regardless of personal costs accrued by recipients. Under the previous
welfare program, the federal government reimbursed the states for certain
expenses undertaken by AFDC, AFDC Administration, JOBS and
Emergency Assistance programs.246 The structure of the new TANF
program is substantially different.  TANF consolidates and replaces these
programs granting each state an annual block grant, calculated according to
the state’s total expenses under the four programs in previous years.247 The
242. CRANSTON, supra note 13, at 41.
243. DEAKIN&WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 138.
244. Id., 82.
245. WEBB&WEBB II, supra note 50, at 643 (quoting Sir Charles Trevelyan, speaking on behalf of
the Charity Organisation Society to the Times, December 24, 1878); DEAKIN & WILKINSON, supra note
1, at 130–31.
246. BENNETT& SULLIVAN, supra note 28, at 741.
247. PRWORA § 103, § 403 (Grants to States), § 416 (Administration). See also H. COMMITTEE
ONWAYS ANDMEANS, supra note 113, at 14.
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result creates a simple economic incentive for the states: “states make
money when clients are dropped from the rolls . . . .”248 Moreover, even
though inflation has been relatively low over the last decade, by 2007 the
purchasing power of block grants had declined by twenty-three percent
since 1997.249 The modern economic facets of welfare-to-work are neatly
represented in TANF, as shown below.
i) Participation Rates: Under PRWORA, states must meet an escalating
work participation rate for all families within the state receiving benefits.
When the legislation was passed, the participation goal was set to fifty
percent for all families and ninety percent for two-parent families by
2002.250 Starting in 1995, states received a caseload reduction credit
reducing their target by one percentage point for each percentage point
reduction in the TANF caseload.251 Following the reauthorization of TANF
in the DRA of 2005, adjustments to participation rates are based on
caseload reductions after 2005 (which saw an historic low level of
caseloads) rather than 1995.252 As a result of these new 2005 provisions,
states have been forced to clear or, perhaps, “cream” the roles from those
employable welfare recipients.  This means, however, that those who have
remained on TANF are individuals facing serious barriers to employment,
including physical and mental health problems, substance abuse, learning
disabilities, and low cognitive functioning.253 This conclusion is
reminiscent of one of Goodin’s insights,254 discussed above, that the more
successful programs are, the fewer “undeserving” recipients remain on the
roles.
The federal rules governing the activities that count towards these
work participation rates are detailed and complex, and include education,
job search, and training programs.255 For example, recipients in single-
parent families with a child under six must participate for twenty hours per
week; other single parent families must participate for thirty hours a week; a
two parent family not receiving federally funded child care must participate
for thirty-five hours a week, and if they do receive child care—for fifty-five
248. HANDLER, supra note 26, at 58.
249. SHARON PARROTT, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, and ALLEGRA BAIDER, CTR.
FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY, IMPLEMENTING THE TANF CHANGES AND THE DEFICIT REDUCTION
ACT: “WIN-WIN” SOLUTIONS FOR FAMILIES AND STATES 110 (2nd ed., Washington, D.C. 2007),
http://www.cbpp.org/2-9-07tanf.pdf (last visited November 23, 2008).
250. HANDLER, supra note 26, at 26.
251. MARK GREENBERG & SHARON PARROTT, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES,
SUMMARY OF THEWORK PARTICIPATION PROVISIONS IN THE BUDGET RECONCILIATION BILL 2 (2006).
252. DRA § 7102(a), Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006).
253. HANDLER, supra note 26, at 210; DEMETRA SMITH NIGHTINGALE, NANCY PINDUS & JOHN
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51 (2002)
254. GOODIN, supra note 76 and discussion there.
255. PRWORA § 407; CFR 45 § 261.30-36.
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hours a week.256 At least twenty hours per week under the all-families rate
and thirty hours per week under the two-parent rate must be attributable to
one of twelve enumerated occupations.257 The DRA limits the range to nine
core activities, and three non-core activities.258 The latter may be assigned
to participants only under certain conditions.  The core occupations include:
unsubsidized employment, subsidized private or public sector employment,
on-the-job training, job search and job readiness assistance, community
service programs, vocational educational training, child care services to
individuals participating in a community service program.
ii) Time Limit on Eligibility: States may be penalized for failure to
comply with a new sixty month limit on assistance.259 According to the
measure, a state may not use any part of the grant to provide assistance to a
family that includes an adult who received assistance under any state
program for sixty months (whether or not consecutive) after the date the
TANF program commenced.260 While states may exempt up to twenty
percent of individuals ofn their caseload from this requirement, they may
also choose to enforce even more stringent time limits.  Indeed, six states
impose lifetime limits of less than sixty months and eleven states impose a
fixed-time limit of twenty-four consecutive months within the sixty month
period.261 Undoubtedly, TANF’s most controversial measure was placing
time limit on welfare benefits. 262
Directly related to time limited benefits is the legislative proclamation
that no individual or family is entitled to income assistance.263 The
proclamation has obvious rhetorical value, clarifying that abolishing federal
entitlement implies “greater [government] discretion with regards to
services and supports provided, expectations placed on clients and
application of sanction policies”.264 But, in addition, the assertion that
Americans no longer enjoy a right to welfare is also derived from the state-
focused and consequentialist-oriented perspective.  To reiterate: when
benefit recipients reach their five-year limit, they lose their eligibility even
if they exhibit the same criteria as they did when they first applied for
256. PRWORA § 407(c)(1); 42 U.S.C § 607(c).
257. 45 CFR § 261.30
258. 42 USC § 607(c)(1) ; § 607(d) ; 45 CFR § 261.31 (narrowing the terms set in PRWORA §
407(d)).
259. PRWORA § 408(a)(7).
260. Id.
261. HANDLER, supra note 26, at 47.
262. The idea was originally proposed by David Ellwood, who later joined the Clinton
administration to implement the concept. See DAVID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT 124-127, 238
(1988) (proposing to replace the current welfare system with a “transitional support system”).
263. PRWORA § 401(b).
264. ALAN WEIL, Assessing Welfare Reform in the United States, in WELFARE REFORM: A
COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE FRENCH AND U.S. EXPERIENCES 145, 159 (Neil Gilbert and
Antoine Parent eds., 2004).
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benefits.  Although some welfare critics justify these restrictive measures as
a deterrent,265 is seems illogical that time restrictions would have an impact
on the incentives or disincentives that individuals consider when applying
for benefits.  For if individuals lose the entitlement to welfare simply
because their benefits expire, this completely evades the personal cost-
benefit analysis.  Structural conditions, such as the state of the economy or
the local job market, may make labor market inclusion an unrealistic goal,
at a given time, despite serious individual effort.  Limited cognitive
abilities, borderline mental health and substance abuse may also be
significant barriers to attainment of employment.266 Beneficiaries may
require government assistance, on such occasions, as a remedy of last
resort.  Rather than a deterrent, a policy that allows welfare entitlement to
expire is rooted in the desire to reduce government expenses.
Incidentally, it is noted that research of the effects of time limits is
beginning to accumulate, as an increasing number of beneficiaries are
exhausting their entitlement.  Thus, a decade after adding time limits to
welfare, research of Wisconsin’s TANF program found that in the sixth
year of leaving TANF, only 16 percent of families had earnings above the
federal poverty line, while sixty percent were defined extremely poor
(defined as families earning twenty-five percent less than the federal
poverty line).267 More generally, a recent government survey across ten
states whose welfare cases were closed because of time limits found that
time limit leavers were materially worse off than they were, with fifty-seven
percent agreeing that they were “just barely making it from day to day”, and
many experiencing food insecurity and even hunger.268
VI.
THE STRICTLY CONTRACTUALRATIONALE
We have now reached the most interesting rationale underlying
historical and current welfare-to-work programs: conditioning for the sake
of conditioning.  The rationale governing the provisions discussed in this
section is not neutral in any way.269 Rather, the motivation for conditioning
benefits is purely contractual.  In other words, the mechanism of
conditioning here is not used as a vehicle for the moral betterment of
individuals, for efficiency, or for deterrence.  Rather, the contractual
265. See, e.g., King, In the Name of Liberalism, supra note 17, at 278.
266. PARROTT&BAIDER, supra note 249, at 27.
267. PARROTT&BAIDER, supra note 249, at 27.
268. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, WELFARE TIME LIMITS AN UPDATE
ON STATE POLICIES, IMPLEMENTATION, AND EFFECTS ON FAMILIES Ch. 5 (April 2008), available at:
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/opre/welfare_employ/sep_state/reports/time_limits/
time_limits_ch5.html.
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discourse embodies the ideology of reciprocity, offering the notion that a
“something for nothing” attitude is immoral and unjust.  Instead, the
guiding principle for government benefits should be that “those who
willingly share in the social product have a corresponding obligation to
make a reasonable ([albeit] relatively proportional) productive contribution
to the community in return.”270
This contractual rationale, it is suggested here, views human
interaction through a quid-pro-quo lens.  The use of the contractual
terminology is not incidental. Interactions are equated with transaction,
which elevate market intuitions to public policy principles and imply that
imposing duties on right holders is feasible, efficient, and, most strikingly,
morally just.  Appealing to our market intuition, which suggests that we
would not enter a contract that offers nothing for something, this paradigm
suggests that the same is true for all human interaction and for the welfare
sphere in particular.
Furthermore, the contractual approach neither accepts nor rejects the
idea that unemployed men and women should receive assistance solely on
account of their condition. Instead, the proponents of this approach
acknowledge the fact that relief is granted, and focus on the question of
what the beneficiaries of relief should be required to do in return.  The most
straightforward reply is that the claimant should take care of himself before
he expects assistance.  This might mean that the recipient must accept any
offer of employment.  In fact, the Vagrancy Act 1824271 stated that willfully
refusing employment, even when the wages offered were inadequate or
below the accepted rate, is a criminal offence punishable by one month’s
hard labor.272 Only in the early twentieth century did the English courts
begin to place constraints on the conditions of the work that must be
accepted, if offered.273
The quid-pro-quo rationale has reached such prominence in
contemporary policies that many writers propose the term “contractual
welfare” as the governing approach for all welfare policies.274 Proponents
of this view sometimes exploit the concept of a “social contract,” which
was employed historically to provide legitimation for state authority, and
more recently as a mechanism to identify the reciprocal rights and duties of
the citizen and her government.275 Handler and Hasenfeld describe this
approach:
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Citizens have responsibilities, not entitlements, some conservatives said.
This is the social contract; it was a matter of fairness, of equity.  The ‘truly
needy’ deserved to be helped, but they must also contribute to society by
supporting themselves and their families if they can.276
However, the contractual approach offers a much narrower view than
that suggested by historical or contemporary social contract theories.277 On
one level, the quid-pro-quo ideology shares some similarities with the
economic approach.  Individuals are presumed to have the same bargaining
power as the state, and thus able to accept or reject offers given to them.
The problems of poverty and unemployment are individualized, so
contracting with individuals is offered as a natural practice to deal with
issues of public policy.  Since the idea of unemployment as a structural
phenomenon was introduced in Britain only in the 1880s, “signifying an
abstract, impersonal, amoral condition, in contrast to the older word
‘unemployed,’”278 it seems that the individualized approach has never been
seriously contested.  As King notes, policy in the United States operates
under a similar paradigm:
With [brief exceptions in the 1930s and 1960s] . . . unemployment and
welfare dependency [in the United States] have been viewed as problems of
individual indolence rather than as structural manifestations of an industrial
economy.279
But the quid-pro-quo rationale also adds a normative perspective.  The
argument suggests that it is intolerable for the poor to loaf about while
receiving government money.  This argument would therefore justify
“occupying” the poor in any manner possible.  Yet this attitude is
distinguished from an approach that focuses on deterrence or on economic
incentives.  The work demanded is not meant to have a deterrent effect: the
work is not intentionally meant to be repulsive enough to deter the poor
from applying for relief.  But the work also falls short of contributing to the
economy and, at times, demands laid upon the poor are more costly than
any profit gained.  Under the English poor laws, initiatives such as Relief
Work or Employment Relief sought to put able bodied men to work for
local authorities or charitable institutions, for sums that were on par with
the relief already granted to them, and well below the market rate.280
Notwithstanding some of noted accomplishments of the New Deal
schemes or of “work relief” under the Public Works Administration,281 it is
276. JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, WE THE POOR PEOPLE: WORK, POVERTY &
WELFARE 9 (1997) (emphasis in original); cf. MEAD, supra note 162, at 189 ff (addressing attitudes
against forcing obligation in general, and in the welfare realm in particular).
277. AMIR PAZ-FUCHS, Rights, Duties and Conditioning Welfare 21 CANADIAN J. OF L. AND
JURISPRUDENCE 175 (2008).
278. HIMMELFARB, supra note 11, at 13.
279. KING, IN THENAME OF LIBERALISM, supra note 17, at 258.
280. WEBB&WEBB II, supra note 50, at 642–43.
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clear that at times benefits were conditioned upon fulfillment of almost
useless tasks.  Josephine Brown describes work projects under the New
Deal that were “invented as an excuse for work, obviously made for the
purpose of creating means whereby recipients of relief could make some
payment for what they received.”282 But she collapses the distinction
between an economic motivation and a quid-pro-quo rationale when she
states that:
Many people who were not willing to give outright relief to the needy,
believed in making them work for what they received, so that the
community would have a return for the money expended.  They even
insisted that the needy should ‘work’, although this might mean no more
than putting them through the motions, as was the case on many a ‘leaf-
raking’ project.283
Though, as it was made clear above, there will always be borderline
cases that are affected by more than one rationale, projects that put
recipients “through the motions” seem to be paradigmatic examples of
conditions for the sheer purpose of requiring individuals to “do something”
rather than providing a “return for the money expended.”
The Labor Yards, discussed above, may also be seen as a manifestation
of the quid-pro-quo perspective, especially when one considers the type of
work demanded from the poor.  Indeed, while the most repulsive and
humiliating “occupations” had a distinct deterrent facet, and others, initiated
after the publication of the Chamberlain circular, had some economic merit,
the poor were also required to take on odd jobs such as cleaning, painting
and decorating poor law institutions.284 It is difficult, in these cases, to
avoid the inference that the motivation behind employing the poor in this
manner fits the quid-pro-quo analysis.
On a jurisprudential level, the strictly contractual rationale suggests
that one cannot expect something for nothing and that rights have to be
balanced with responsibilities.  Workfare, one of the prominent features of
modern welfare-to-work programs, has such a distinct quid-pro-quo nature.
In essence, workfare schemes all have in common “the requirement that the
poor work for their benefits.”285 According to this approach, the opposing
views as to the beneficial or deterrent consequences of workfare should be
seen as a side-effect of the scheme’s main purpose: to provide “services of
value to local communities in return for their expenditures on welfare.”286
Moreover, the services are not given “in return” in the traditional sense.
2033-2041.
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Claimants are required to do something, even if it is unproductive and
costly, in order to demonstrate that they have made an effort.  Work-tests,
unlike workfare, do not demand actual work contribution but rather test the
claimant’s willingness to work by demanding that she actively seek
employment or that she participate in training schemes.287 Work-tests also
belong under the strictly contractual heading, because they are intended to
separate the deserving from the undeserving, assuring that those receiving
benefits have acted responsibly by pursuing all available alternative routes.
And, indeed, current programs proudly place high currency on
workfare and on the “obligation to volunteer,” as oxymoronic as that phrase
may be.  Like many other features, they are far from novel.  The legal
platform for these programs was established through the seemingly
innocuous research provision contained in section 1115 of the Social
Security Act, allowing states to replace existing federal programs with
“experimental, pilot or demonstration” initiatives.288 Waivers were granted
with greater frequency during the Reagan administration as a result of
welfare provisions included in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
(OBRA) 1981.289 By the time the 1988 Family Support Act (FSA)290 was
passed, thirty states responded favorably to this opportunity,291 and by 1996,
forty-three states had waiver-based programs.292 Highly popular amongst
the various state schemes was the Community Work Experience Program
(CWEP).  According to the House of Representatives’ Committee of Ways
and Means, these programs
required adult AFDC recipients to perform some sort of community work,
such as park beautification or as a teacher aide, in exchange for the AFDC
benefit.  The individual does not become a paid employee but, instead,
works off the AFDC benefit.  The number of hours a person works may not
exceed their AFDC grant divided by the applicable minimum wage.293
The rhetoric of the time reveals a budding discourse of strict
contractualism, balancing rights and responsibilities.  Thus, the National
Governors Association wrote in support of the reforms:
The principal responsibility of government in the welfare contract is to
287. PAUL BOU-HABIB & SERENA OLSARETTI, Liberal Egalitarianism and Workfare, 21 J. OF
APPLIED PHILOSOPHY 257, 258 (2004).
288. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (Supp. III 1991); see WILLIAMS, supra note 28, at 10-13.
289. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981, 98 Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (1981); see SHELLY ARSENAULT, Welfare Policy Innovation and
Diffusion 32 STATE AND LOCALGOVERNMENT REV. 49, 55 (2000).
290. Family Support Act, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.) (1988).
291. BENNETT& SULLIVAN, supra note 28, at 742.
292. HANDLER& HASENFELD, supra note 61, at 181.
293. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 101ST CONG., BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND
DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 523
(Comm. Print 1989).
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provide education, job training and/or job placement services to all
employable recipients . . . The major obligation of the individual in the
public assistance contracts we propose is to prepare for and seek, accept,
and retain a job.294
With this background in mind, it would be useful to examine the
details of the TANF program that exhibit a quid-pro-quo rationale:
i) Work-tests: Recipients must accept any offered work, without
exceptions for prior work experience, prior earnings, education or training.
Though the concept of “willingness to work” was always present in the
background of Food Stamp Act amendments,295 PRWORA broke with
tradition by establishing formal work requirements for FSP participants.296
The current law states that able-bodied adults without dependants are
subjected to the new work requirements.  In order to fulfill the work
requirement, an individual must register for employment every twelve
months.  Additionally, an individual will lose entitlement in the following
cases: for refusing to participate in an employment and training program
without good cause; for refusing, without good cause, to accept an offer of
employment at a wage not less than the applicable minimum wage; for
refusing to provide information required to determine employment status or
job availability; or for voluntarily and without good cause quitting a job or
reducing work effort to less than thirty hours per week. 297 In addition,
adults not engaged for at least twenty hours or more per week in work,
training or workfare schemes will have their eligibility for benefits limited
to a maximum of three months in any thirty-month period.298
Unlike Britain, the requirement to actively seek work has not become
part of the legislative framework that governs the American programs.  In
practice, however, the situation is not much different.  In fact, in many
cases applicants are required to conduct independent job searches while the
application for benefits is pending.  This period can range from two to six
weeks, and claimants are sometimes required to contact up to four
employers per day.299
ii) Work-Related Activity: As part of the “work first” ideology, welfare
294. KING, Actively Seeking Work?, supra note 8, at 175 (quoting NATIONAL GOVERNORS’
ASSOCIATION, JOB-ORIENTED WELFARE REFORM 1-2 (1987); see also KING, Actively Seeking Work,
supra note 8, at 276.
295. See Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986), superseded by statute, McKinney Homeless
Assistance Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2012(i)(3) (redefining “household” to include children of parents who share a
single household dwelling); Lyng v. Int’l Union, 485 U.S. 360, 371 (1988) (strikers disqualified from
food stamp program); cf GERALD R. WEBER JR., The Striker Amendment to the Food Stamp Act: Politics
Chipping Away at the Union, Family, and Social Welfare, 22 GA. L. REV. 741 (1988) (criticizing the
striker amendment for running against “American perceptions of social welfare, labor unions, and
family” – Id. at 770-771).
296. PRWORA § 815(d).
297. PRWORA § 815(a) replacing 7 USC § 2015(d)(1).
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recipients must be engaged in some kind of work-related activity (as
defined by the state) when they are ready for work or after twenty-four
months of coming on assistance, whichever is earlier.300 However, it is not
clear how this requirement may be satisfied.  For example, the federal
mandate does not explain whether self-employment, volunteer work, or
other form of non-gainful employment will satisfy the condition.301
Moreover, Tthe assumption that participation in the workplace will nurture
and expand aptitude to enter the paid labor market has not been born out.302
In fact, there is growing evidence that forced inclusion into the labor market
has proven to be an obstacle to mobility, as less and less workers are
moving up the economic ladder.303 Some of the jobs that recipients were
sent to required no skills at all, and did nothing to develop hidden aptitudes.
In one well known case, women were required to sort coin-sized toys into
piles of different colors.  When they finished, a supervisor reshuffled the
pile and the next crew began anew.304
iii) Workfare: After two months of receiving assistance, a parent or
caretaker receiving assistance must partake in community service
employment, with minimum hours per week and tasks to be determined by
the state.  For the first time, PRWORA also introduced workfare
requirements to participants in FSP.  Subject to the exception detailed
below, states must penalize individuals if they refuse to engage in the
required work.  The penalty may take the form of a pro rata reduction of
assistance otherwise payable to the family with respect to any period in
which the individual so refuses, or by completely terminating the
assistance.  In addition, a measure that did not exist under the AFDC was
added; a state may terminate Medicaid (health insurance for poor
individuals) for recipients, though not for their children, if their cash
assistance has been terminated.305 The state may exempt individuals if they
show good cause or under other exceptions that the state establishes.306 The
state may not reduce or terminate assistance to a single custodial parent
caring for a child who is under six years old if certain conditions apply.307
iv) Individual Responsibility Plan: States must devise an individual
300. PRWORA § 103, replacing § 402(a)(1)(A)(ii) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 601 et
seq.).
301. NEIL GILBERT, Welfare Policy in the United States: The Road from Income Maintenance to
Workfare, inWELFARE REFORM, supra note 210, at 55, 61.
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304. DEPARLE, supra note 144, at 168.
305. PRWORA § 114(b)(3).
306. PRWORA § 407(e)(1).
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responsibility plan for any individual who is over eighteen years old, has
not completed high school, or has not obtained an equivalent certificate and
is not attending secondary school.  The plan will set an employment goal
for the individual, a general scheme for moving the individual into private
sector employment and the obligations of the individual during that time.
Obligations may include attending school, maintaining grades, keeping
school-age children in school, immunizing children and undergoing
appropriate substance abuse treatment.308 The plan is to be constructed
within ninety days (and in certain cases within thirty days) of the receipt of
assistance.  The individual’s failure to comply with the responsibility plan
may, in addition to any other penalty, result in a reduction of benefits.309
Problematically, however, recent studies show that the personal
responsibility plan is a contract by name only.  In fact, agency workers
construct the terms of the welfare contract while excluding the client from
the process and recipients have little recourse in getting the welfare
department to meet its part of the contract.310 Thus, one Member of the
British Parliament characterized a similar Jobseeker’s Agreement as “an
abuse of language in an abuse of power.”311
VII.
CONCLUSION
History does, indeed, repeat itself.  Welfare-to-work programs are not
an exception to this rule.  In reviewing the publicly administered assistance
programs of the poor law era, I highlighted several important themes that
serve as the foundations of current welfare-to-work programs.  At times, the
article referred to legal provisions and policies that are centuries apart.  This
shows, of course, that this article is not meant to be an exhaustive historical
tract.  Rather, its purpose is to introduce several themes that played a role in
the construction of historical and modern welfare-to-work programs.
More importantly, these themes are present, at times in different shape
or form, in contemporary programs.  The historical parallels were drawn out
through reference to the four rationales that governed poor law programs—
deterrence, morality, economics and quid-pro-quo.  It was argued that these
rationales inform, in varying degrees, programs that are in force today in
different jurisdictions.  Then as now, policy makers aim to deter eligible
beneficiaries from seeking assistance; government wishes to reform the
moral character of beneficiaries; the costs of social programs has always
308. PRWORA § 103, replacing section 408(b)(2) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 601 et
seq.).
309. PRWORA § 103, replacing section 408(b) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 601 et seq.).
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been a central consideration; and the idea of social assistance as conditional
only upon proof that something is given in return is prevalent now as it was
during the poor law era.  These four rationales, as distinct as they may
appear at first glance, actually stem from a coherent paradigm: the idea that
relief is conditional. As Deakin and Wilkinson conclude, “it is in precisely
those periods when a belief in the ‘natural’ properties of the market is at its
strongest, that the administration of social welfare is at its most
repressive.”312
Moreover, American programs revisit the poor law fundamentals not
only in rationales, but also in concrete policy.  Noteworthy amongst these
are means testing, keeping benefit rates below labor market rates,
emphasizing fraud detection, work testing, focusing on single parents and
young adults, and even ceremoniously signing a contract between the
agency and the claimant.
We find, then, that public opinion, policy, and legislation are drawn
back to contractual discourse of the kind exhibited during the poor law era.
This phenomenon may be attributed, in part, to welfare state fatigue and
disillusionment.  In addition, the accompanying themes of the poor law era
have regained prominence.  These include the elusive distinction between
deserving and undeserving poor that resurfaces along with the principle of
less eligibility.  We also find that personal responsibility makes an
appearance not only in poor law discourse, but also in contemporary
approaches to welfare state programs.  Moralistic agendas, which blame the
poor for their lack of responsibility, were present both during the
workhouse era with schemes designed to instill a sense of responsibility in
the pauper.  Nowadays, however, the concept of personal responsibility
must be reconciled with basic human rights and fundamental welfare state
intuitions.  The constitutional and moral framework that governed the civil
rights era and the establishment of the welfare state must remain intact,
especially when and where unpopular social programs and beneficiaries are
involved.
This convergence of past and present, and the abstract and concrete,
indicates that current welfare-to-work programs have retreated from the
egalitarian ideals exhibited in the early welfare state era, such as a strive to
equal opportunity, social and economic protection in times of income loss,
economic redistribution and a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work.  In other
words, policy makers have shown a preference for poor law philosophy
over continuing the welfare-state project.  This moral and economic
philosophy is clearly manifested in the renewed emphasis on the four
rationales noted above.
312. DEAKIN&WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 199.
